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What does the future hold for procedural due process? From the due process
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s until recently, constitutional litigation was the
primary driver of procedural innovation. Plaintiﬀs brought lawsuits challenging
existing procedures under the Due Process Clause, and courts used the Supreme
Court’s cost–benefit, interest-balancing approach to determine the specific dictates of
due process. That approach reflected the Court’s longstanding view of procedural due
process as flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances, but it also imposed
significant evidentiary hurdles on due process plaintiﬀs. As a result, in recent years,
due process doctrine has stagnated, with courts less and less interested in ordering
additional or alternative procedural safeguards.
At the same time, bottom-up procedural experimentation is on the rise. Across
jurisdictions and legal contexts, government agencies and court systems are reforming
procedures in ways that have been unachievable through litigation. These reforms—for
example, creating a right to counsel in deportation and eviction cases, adopting
electronic forms of notice, and requiring judges to play an active role in cases with pro
se litigants—strike at the heart of the due process guarantee, yet the courts are not
driving these changes. This has created a growing gap between due process doctrine and
procedural innovations that are not the result of litigation.
This Article analyzes the current divergence between due process doctrine and
practice. It begins by tracing the shift from the due process revolution’s court-driven
procedures to today’s bottom-up experimentation. Next, it examines three recent
examples of procedural experimentation and situates those innovations within the
Supreme Court’s due process doctrine. The Article then proposes a dialogic approach
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to procedural due process, through which data generated by procedural innovations
can help courts evaluate due process claims in litigation. By putting courts in
conversation with the wave of procedural innovations unfolding across the nation,
this dialogic approach can help revive an otherwise stagnant branch of constitutional
doctrine and ensure that the Due Process Clause continues to guarantee fair
procedures in the face of changing circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
What does the future hold for procedural due process? Not too long ago,
in the 1960s and 1970s, procedural due process claims occupied a prominent
place on the Supreme Court’s docket and attracted the attention of the nation’s
leading legal scholars. A series of Court decisions culminating in Goldberg v.
Kelly1 greatly expanded the scope of the Due Process Clause’s coverage,

1

397 U.S. 254 (1970).

2019]

Dialogic Due Process

1117

triggering an “explosion”2 in due process litigation that came to be known as
the “due process revolution.”3 Constitutional litigation was the primary driver
of procedural innovation, with judges ruling that the Due Process Clause
demanded more or different procedures in cases involving issues as diverse as
welfare benefits,4 school discipline,5 family law,6 immigration deportation,7
and public employment.8 In 1976, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge9 adopted a
cost–benefit approach for determining the requirements of procedural due
process in civil contexts,10 and government agencies eventually conformed
their procedures to the constitutional requirements. Since the 1990s,
procedural due process doctrine has been relatively stable, with few notable
Supreme Court decisions and limited scholarly analysis.11
Even as due process doctrine stabilized, the facts and circumstances of many
procedural contexts have continued to evolve. The more things change, the more
likely it is that decades-old procedures must be updated to ensure fundamental
fairness. Although the Supreme Court has explained that “‘due process,’ unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances,”12 its modern approach to procedural due process
imposes significant evidentiary hurdles on plaintiffs bringing due process

2 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975); see also JERRY
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9 (1985) (noting that “federal court
complaints of procedural due process deprivation in the 1970s showed a 350 percent increase over
the 1960s,” compared to a seventy percent increase in federal civil litigation of all kinds).
3 MASHAW, supra note 2, at 33 (“[B]y most accounts the due process revolution began with the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . .”).
4 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 274-75 (1970) (holding that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before certain government beneﬁts
can be discontinued).
5 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (establishing due process protections for
students facing suspensions of ten days or less).
6 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (deﬁning the required standard of proof
as “clear and convincing” in cases terminating parental custody rights).
7 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (holding that lawful permanent
residents are entitled to certain due process protections).
8 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985) (holding that
public employees are entitled to due process before losing their employment).
9 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
10 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979) (characterizing the Mathews analysis as “a
general approach” for determining the speciﬁc procedures required by due process).
11 See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1334-36 (2012)
(discussing the ossiﬁcation of due process procedures and the stagnation of procedural due process
scholarship). The Supreme Court’s most notable recent procedural due process decision did not
result in a meaningful change to the Mathews analysis. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011)
(rejecting a claim that the Due Process Clause automatically requires the provision of counsel at
civil contempt proceedings when the defendant is an indigent individual facing incarceration for
failure to pay child support to a child’s unrepresented custodian).
12 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334).
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claims. As a result, courts have not been actively reassessing or reevaluating the
constitutionality of longstanding procedural regimes.
Yet procedural innovation has not stopped. In recent years, federal, state,
and local agencies and court systems have been experimenting with new and
additional procedures in a wide range of legal contexts. Cities have passed
legislation guaranteeing government-funded lawyers for indigent people
facing eviction and deportation.13 Agencies have adopted electronic
notiﬁcation systems to ensure that families receiving essential public beneﬁts
are given fast and reliable notice of beneﬁt terminations or changes.14 And
judges have developed practices and procedures for taking a more active role
in cases involving pro se litigants.15 These experimental procedures hold the
potential to beneﬁt countless individuals and families, improving the fairness
of legal proceedings where the stakes could not be higher.
These new procedural innovations share three notable features. First, they
are not the result of litigation involving due process claims. Instead, they have
emerged through policy and legislative reforms or other initiatives that took
eﬀect without constitutional litigation. Second, even though these
innovations are not court-driven, their proponents use the language of “due
process” when explaining why the new procedures are necessary and valuable.
And third, the innovations are either similar to, or extensions of, procedural
innovations that have been the product of due process litigation in the past.
In other words, despite being delinked from constitutional litigation and the
development of due process doctrine, the new wave of innovation remains
fundamentally connected to the Constitution’s due process guarantee.

13 See, e.g., Liz Robbins, Mayor and City Council Make Deal on Lawyers for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/nyregion/mayor-and-city-council-make-deal-onlawyers-for-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/KFM8-G49K] (reporting on continued funding for a
project that guarantees representation for indigent immigrants held in detention during their deportation
proceedings); Press Release, Office of the Mayor of N.Y.C., Mayor de Blasio and Speaker Mark-Viverito
Rally Around Universal Access to Free Legal Services for Tenants Facing Eviction in Housing Court
(Feb. 12, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/079-17/state-the-city-mayor-de-blasiospeaker-mark-viverito-rally-universal-access-free [https://perma.cc/EQ62-E45Y] (announcing funding
that guarantees “all NYC tenants facing eviction access to free legal advice and low-income tenants with
full legal representation”).
14 See, e.g., Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Dir., Program Dev. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to
All Reg’l Dirs., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Nov. 3, 2017), https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/ﬁles/snap/Memo-Electronic-Notice-and-Other-Options-11317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HAG-4EVS] (announcing changes to the electronic notiﬁcation system for the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program).
15 See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647,
649-50 (2017) (examining how judges change their practices when proceedings involve pro se litigants);
Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving Housing
Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1059-60 (2017) (examining alternative judicial decisionmaking and
procedural approaches in housing court cases involving pro se litigants).
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As procedural innovations proliferate, how will they aﬀect due process
doctrine? Perhaps not at all—the innovations may take root or not, while the
doctrine remains essentially static. After all, states and cities are free to
provide procedural safeguards above and beyond the ﬂoor established by the
Constitution. Under this view, bottom-up procedural innovations could serve
as merely an interesting footnote to our understanding of the Due Process
Clause—highly meaningful to the individuals and proceedings they aﬀect but
inconsequential as a doctrinal matter and irrelevant to people living in places
where the innovations are not available.
This Article considers a diﬀerent outcome, one that is shaped by a
dialogue between bottom-up procedural innovations and the courts’
development of due process doctrine. For over forty years, since its decision
in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutionality
of procedural rules based on a fact-intensive cost–beneﬁt analysis.16 Under
Mathews, courts must consider three factors when determining the “speciﬁc
dictates” of procedural due process:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be aﬀected by the oﬃcial action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and ﬁnally the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the ﬁscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.17

The Court uses a similar balancing approach when considering whether the
notice provided by the government satisﬁes due process.18 Thus, the
procedural due process analysis is sensitive to the facts and circumstances of
a particular procedural regime. This distinguishes due process from other
individual rights conferred by the Constitution, making due process
amenable to reevaluation and revision.
The recent wave of procedural experimentation is generating precisely the
kind of evidence that can inﬂuence future due process balancing. For each
innovation, it may be possible to answer the following questions, among
others: How much does a particular innovation cost? To what extent does it
help avoid erroneous deprivations of constitutionally protected interests? Is
it administratively feasible? As each innovation is implemented, it will be
possible to gather data and answer these questions in ways that would be
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Id. at 319.
See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006) (“[A]ssessing the adequacy of a particular
form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of the State’ against ‘the individual interest sought to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950))).
16
17
18
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otherwise impossible. This evidence could then be used to fuel litigation
eﬀorts to push due process doctrine in new and important directions.
To be sure, there may be reasons to resist constitutionalizing the latest
procedural innovations. Ever since the due process revolution, judges,
government oﬃcials, advocates, and scholars have expressed concerns about
extending the scope of constitutional protection.19 Just because an innovation
is feasible or appropriate in one context or in one location does not necessarily
mean that it should be extended more broadly. Similarly, some worry that
raising the constitutional ﬂoor will stiﬂe future innovation.20 Put simply, the
recent ﬂourishing of innovation could be perceived as proof that the courts
and the Constitution should keep out. And fears of increased uncertainty and
disruption are not to be taken lightly.21
But the requirements of due process are particularly well-suited to evolve
based on a dialogue between on-the-ground experimentation and legal
doctrine. As the Supreme Court has emphasized in case after case, “due
process is ﬂexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.”22 While the extent to which other constitutional rights
may change over time is subject to intense dispute,23 the procedural rights
conferred by the Due Process Clause are under no such constraints.24
The idea that changing facts and circumstances can affect the meaning of
a constitutional right is not a novel one. Courts interpreting the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures”25 look to an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,”26 which evolves over time.
Similarly, courts interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel
and unusual punishments”27 consider “evolving standards of decency that mark

See infra subsection III.C.1.
See infra subsection III.C.2.
See infra subsection III.C.3.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10
(1991) (contrasting due process with bright-line legal rules and noting the importance of contextual
factors). See generally infra subsection III.B.1.
23 Compare Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV.
673, 736 (1963) (“A constitutional provision can maintain its integrity only by moving in the same
direction and at the same rate as the rest of society.”), with William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that the Constitution was “designed
to enable the popularly elected branches of government, not the judicial branch, to keep the country
abreast of the times”).
24 See Parkin, supra note 11, at 1360-65 (citing precedent from the late nineteenth century
forward characterizing due process as a “ﬂexible” concept, susceptible to tailoring based on historical
and societal circumstances).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967)).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19
20
21
22
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the progress of a maturing society.”28 Nor is the concept of dialogue foreign to
constitutional law, though it is typically used to describe an exchange between
courts and legislatures29 or government officials and affected individuals.30
This Article argues that a dialogic approach to procedural due process can
reunify and revive due process doctrine. I do not suggest that every procedural
innovation must be incorporated into due process doctrine—just that courts
reviewing due process claims can and should look to non-court-driven reforms
for insight into what the Due Process Clause requires. Specifically, courts
should consider the data and information generated by procedural reforms
when applying the interest-balancing tests mandated by the Supreme Court’s
modern approach to due process. The result of that balancing may or may not
provide a basis for courts to order additional or alternative procedural
safeguards, but this kind of dialogue offers an opportunity to connect due
process litigation with non-court-driven innovation and to revive an
increasingly stagnant aspect of due process doctrine.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of the
Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due process. It highlights
the role of courts as the drivers of procedural reform, particularly in the wake
of the due process revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. After summarizing the
leading critiques of the Court’s modern approach to due process, Part I
concludes by noting the relative stability of contemporary procedural due
process theory and doctrine.
Part II turns away from court-driven procedure and toward the recent
trend of procedural reform arising outside the context of constitutional
litigation. It profiles three recent procedural innovations: a local legislature’s
creation of a right to counsel in deportation and eviction proceedings, a federal
agency’s approval of notice by electronic means, and trial court judges’
adoption of an “active judging” approach to cases involving pro se parties. This
Part situates each innovation in its doctrinal context, noting that the
innovations would not be attainable through due process litigation. It also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 211 (2008)
(describing the advantages of an approach by which “courts apply constitutional provisions such as the
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause through a dialogic process with the legislature to
ensure that the scope of welfare provision democratically reflects our social understandings”).
30 See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the
Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1002 (1988) (discussing “the possibilities of a coherent
theory of dialogism in the relationship between dependent people and the state”); David L. Kirp,
Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 842 (1976)
(describing the potential for due process hearings in the school discipline context to be “candid and
informal exchange[s]” between administrators and students); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due
Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 310 (1975) (discussing role of courts in the ongoing
dialogue between the state and individuals subject to the laws of the state).
28
29
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describes how the innovations are generating substantial data and information
about their costs and benefits.
Part III explores how due process doctrine and theory can account for noncourt-driven innovations like the ones profiled in Part II. It begins by
identifying the growing and harmful divergence between due process doctrine
and the kinds of procedures that are actually available to affected individuals.
Then, in light of the Due Process Clause’s deeply rooted flexibility and openness
to evolution based on changing facts and circumstances, this Part proposes a
dialogic approach to due process that encourages courts to consider non-courtdriven innovations when engaging in the requisite cost–benefit balancing to
determine the requirements of due process. This Part then considers the limits
and potential objections to a dialogic approach to procedural due process. The
Article concludes by arguing that a dialogic approach is both consistent with due
process theory and doctrine, and also a useful strategy to bridge the growing gap
between non-court-driven innovations and the courts’ understanding of what
the Due Process Clause requires.
I. COURT-DRIVEN DUE PROCESS
The relationship between courts and procedural due process is not as
straightforward as it may seem. Over time, the Supreme Court has taken
diﬀerent approaches to due process claims, particularly with respect to
evaluating the speciﬁc procedural safeguards required by the Due Process
Clause. Since the 1970s, the Court has used a cost–beneﬁt, interest-balancing
approach, which requires courts to weigh the interests of aﬀected individuals
against the interests of the government. Despite substantial scholarly
criticism, that approach has endured, and it has guided the design of the
procedural regimes that are in eﬀect today.
This Part traces the evolution of due process doctrine and the Supreme
Court’s modern approach to procedural due process. It highlights the Court’s
interventionist rulings during the due process revolution of the 1960s and 1970s,
and the Court’s ultimate retreat to a more deferential approach. It surveys the
procedural reforms that were prompted by due process litigation, and it surfaces
the leading scholarly critiques of the Court’s modern approach to procedural due
process. Finally, this Part notes the relatively stagnant state of current due
process doctrine and theory, and the lack of recent court-driven reforms.
A. The Due Process Revolution and the Modern
Approach to Procedural Due Process
Throughout American history, the nation’s courts have been the arbiters of
whether the government has provided due process of law before depriving
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someone of “life, liberty, or property.”31 For nearly two hundred years, this
inquiry was fairly ad hoc. Judges ruling on due process challenges looked to a
mix of common law, history, tradition, and custom to assess whether the
available procedures survived constitutional scrutiny.32 The Supreme Court had
little to say about the specific procedural protections required by the Due
Process Clause33—in most cases, “the Court merely referred to the requirement
of a ‘hearing,’ on the assumption that everyone understood what it meant by the
term ‘hearing.’”34 Instead, most of its due process rulings focused on whether or
not the government’s action triggered due process protections at all.35
31 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”); Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1890, 1890 (2016) (“In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial
enterprise.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
32 See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277
(1855) (“[W]e must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statue [sic] law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement
of this country.”); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468 (1986) (explaining that after a brief, early attempt
to confine procedural due process to the “procedures that were integral to the English common law
system,” the Court “quickly abandoned this approach, . . . choosing instead to ask whether a given
procedure was essential to modern—as opposed to 17th century—notions of fairness”).
33 See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 797 (5th ed. 2010) (“Until the
1970s, the Court devoted little attention to the question of what process was due once it concluded
that due process applied to an agency’s decisionmaking process.”); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process
and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (1984) (observing that the content of due
process “seemed so clear to prior generations that they included the term ‘due process’ in the ﬁfth
and fourteenth amendments virtually without discussion”).
Legal scholars similarly focused on other aspects of due process. See Redish & Marshall, supra
note 32, at 455-56 (“[N]otwithstanding the voluminous scholarship dedicated to deﬁning the
interests triggering due process, little attention has been given a question of far greater importance
to the typical litigant who invokes the clause: What process is due once it is recognized that the
guarantee applies in a given case?”).
34 PIERCE, supra note 33, at 797-98. “In the relatively few opinions in which the Court
described the nature of the ‘hearing’ required by due process, its brief description suggested that
the Court used ‘hearing’ to refer to a decisionmaking procedure modeled after a judicial trial,
including oral presentation of evidence and cross-examination.” Id. at 798 (citing Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)); see also Greene, 360 U.S. at 496-97 (equating due process procedures
with the type of procedures available at a judicial trial).
35 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a series
of statutes that denied welfare assistance to certain individuals based solely on length of residency);
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (holding that New Mexico
unconstitutionally deprived an applicant to the state bar of his right to due process by denying his
application on the basis of his former membership in the Communist Party); Slochower v. Bd. of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956) (holding that a professor at a public university who
refused to testify about his membership in the Communist Party before a federal legislative
committee was entitled to more process than a “summary dismissal”); United States ex rel. Knauﬀ
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 546-47 (1950) (upholding the Attorney General’s refusal of an
immigration hearing to the noncitizen wife of a World War II veteran).
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The Court’s due process jurisprudence underwent two radical changes in the
1960s and 1970s. In a series of decisions culminating in Goldberg v. Kelly,36 the
Court held that the term “property” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
includes a wider range of interests than the Court had previously recognized.37
While the property interests protected by due process had historically been
limited to “traditional common-law concepts of property,”38 Goldberg held that
entitlements and interests created by the government—such as public benefits,
licenses, and public employment, among many others—could amount to
constitutionally protected property interests as well.39
Goldberg also demonstrated the Court’s new willingness to specify the
procedures required by the Due Process Clause.40 Rather than merely holding
that a “hearing” was required before terminating someone’s welfare beneﬁts,
the Court proceeded to identify the precise procedural safeguards that due
process requires in the welfare context. The Court clariﬁed what it means for
welfare recipients to receive timely and adequate notice,41 stating that
recipients have a right to a hearing before their beneﬁts are terminated.42 The
Court explained that welfare recipients must have an opportunity to present
evidence and argument orally,43 to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses,44 and to appear with an attorney.45 It also stated that hearing
oﬃcers must be impartial and their decisions must be based on the record
created at the hearing.46

36 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963) (citing a series of previous due
process decisions to support holding that an individual’s interest in unemployment compensation
beneﬁts is a right rather than “merely a ‘privilege’”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 555-57 (1958)
(holding a citizen’s interest in a tax exemption to be protected by due process); Slochower, 350 U.S.
at 555-57 (holding that interest in public employment is protected by due process).
37 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
38 Id. at 262 n.8.
39 Id. at 262. In just one year after deciding Goldberg, the Court held that “property” interests
were at issue when the government suspended a driver’s license, denied social security beneﬁts, and
categorized a person as an “excessive” drinker. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436
(1971); see also Friendly, supra note 2, at 1268 (“[T]he Court has carried the hearing requirement from
one new area of government action to another.”).
40 See PIERCE, supra note 33, at 799 (“Goldberg v. Kelly marked the beginning of the Court’s
systematic eﬀort to determine in detail the procedures required for the kind of ‘hearing’ suﬃcient
to satisfy due process.” (internal citation omitted)).
41 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268.
42 Id. at 263-66.
43 Id. at 269.
44 Id. at 269-70.
45 Id. at 270-71.
46 Id. at 271.
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But Goldberg did not announce a method or test for analyzing whether
existing procedures comply with the Due Process Clause.47 Nor did it clarify
whether and when courts should specify the procedures required by due
process.48 In fact, in a handful of cases decided shortly after Goldberg, the
Court took inconsistent approaches to this aspect of the due process analysis,
specifying the procedures in some49 and declining to do so in others.50
It was not until six years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, that the Court
adopted what has become the modern approach to procedural due process.51
The plaintiff in Mathews claimed that the federal government’s procedures for
terminating Social Security disability benefits did not comply with due
process.52 In the course of rejecting the plaintiff ’s claim, the Court announced
a new cost–benefit approach to evaluating whether existing procedures comply
with the Due Process Clause.53 According to Mathews, courts must determine
the “specific dictates of due process” by balancing the following three factors:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be aﬀected by the oﬃcial action; second
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and ﬁnally, the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function
involved and the ﬁscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.54

The Mathews approach marked a departure from the Court’s previous
rulings on procedural due process. The Court paired Goldberg’s willingness to
specify the requirements of procedural due process with an interest-balancing
test for determining whether “additional or substitute procedural safeguards”

47 That said, by 1975 there “ha[d] been a measure of consistency as to the factors which the
Court . . . consider[ed] in determining what due process requires.” Note, Specifying the Procedures
Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1517
(1975) [hereinafter Specifying the Procedures].
48 See id. (“[T]here has been confusion as to whether the Court should itself specify a general set of
procedures for similar future cases or whether it should leave this to be accomplished on a case-by-case
basis.”); cf. PIERCE, supra note 33, at 799 (“Once it decided Goldberg, the Court was forced to consider
carefully and critically what ‘hearing’ mean[t] in the context of resolving administrative disputes.”).
49 See, e.g., Wolﬀ v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
485-89 (1972).
50 See, e.g., N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971).
51 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see also Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 422 (2010) (“The Court’s modern approach to implementing the
procedural aspects of the Due Process Clauses focuses on the three-factor balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge . . . .”).
52 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323-25.
53 Id. at 334-35.
54 Id.
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are required by the Constitution.55 Mathews made no reference to common
law, history, or custom. Rather, its analysis focused on current conditions and
the relative costs and beneﬁts of expanding or modifying existing procedures.
This is not altogether surprising, as Mathews involved a species of “new
property” that until recently had fallen outside the protection of due
process,56 and for which there were no examples of analogous past practices
to guide the due process analysis.57 Yet the Court has since applied Mathews’s
fact-driven, interest-balancing approach across a wide range of civil
proceedings, far beyond the types of “new property” considered by the Court
in Goldberg and Mathews.58
Although Mathews supplied the “general approach” for determining the
procedures required by the Due Process Clause,59 it did not address the notice
that must be provided when the government deprives an individual of “life,
Id. at 335.
The Court’s decision in Goldberg was the ﬁrst time it held that an individual’s interest in
continued receipt of a public beneﬁt could be a “property” interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n.8 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to regard
welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”). Following Goldberg, the Court had
implied—without deciding—that Social Security disability beneﬁts were a “property” interest as
well. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) (“We have held that ‘the interest of a covered
employee under the [Social Security] Act is of suﬃcient substance to fall within the protection from
arbitrary governmental action aﬀorded by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960))); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (“We may accept the
proposition[] advanced by the claimant . . . that the right to Social Security beneﬁts is in one sense
earned.” (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 610) (internal quotations omitted)).
57 Cf. PIERCE, supra note 33, at 798 (“Most of the disputes agencies are required to resolve
today did not exist until recent decades and have no clear historical analogue.”).
58 See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-45 (2011) (right to counsel in civil contempt
proceedings to enforce child support orders); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S.
43, 53-54 (1993) (seizure of real property through civil forfeiture); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11,
24 (1991) (prejudgment attachment); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320,
333-34 (1985) (attorney-payment rules in proceedings involving veterans’ benefits), superseded by statute,
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, as recognized in Cintron v.
West, 13 Vet. App. 251 (Vet. App. 1999); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985)
(firing of public school employees); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (state parental rights
termination proceedings); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-28 (1981) (right to counsel
for indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13
(1981) (payment for blood tests in paternity suits); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)
(involuntary civil commitment to mental hospitals); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (civil
suspension of a driver’s license); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3
(1978) (dismissal from a public university’s medical school).
59 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979) (referring to the Mathews test as “a general
approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim”); see also Gerald L.
Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence”, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 698 (1988)
(“Eldridge balancing has increasingly colonized the domain of due process . . . .”). But cf. Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 331 (1993) (“Although the Supreme Court has treated Mathews as furnishing
a test for all seasons, it was designed for resolving claims of entitlement to particular types of
administrative, rather than judicial, procedures.”).
55
56
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liberty, or property.” It is axiomatic that individuals can exercise their right
to be heard only if they are ﬁrst notiﬁed of the proceedings.60 To assess
whether notice is suﬃcient, the Court has relied on Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., which asks whether notice is “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and aﬀord them an opportunity to present their
objections.”61 Despite their diﬀerences, the Court has clariﬁed that the
Mathews and Mullane tests are to be applied in a similar fashion, with courts
weighing the individual’s interests against the interests of the government.62
B. Court-Driven Procedures
The due process revolution gave rise to the modern, court-centric notion
of procedural due process.63 Whether prompted by court order or merely the
threat of litigation, government agencies were forced to conform old
procedures and create new ones to satisfy the Court’s evolving interpretation

60 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” (quoting
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 223)); see also Friendly, supra note 2, at 1280-81 (“It is . . .
fundamental that notice be given and that it be timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed
action and the grounds for it. Otherwise the individual likely would be unable to marshal evidence and
prepare his case so as to benefit from any hearing that was provided.” (footnote omitted)).
61 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002)
(explaining that courts must use the Mullane reasonableness test—not the Mathews balancing test—when
evaluating due process claims involving notice); W. Alexander Burnett, Casenote, Dusenbery v. United
States: Setting the Standard for Adequate Notice, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 613, 626 (2003) (“In Dusenbery, the
Court affirmed—in no unclear terms—that the Mullane standard is the appropriate analytical framework
for determining whether a method of delivery of notice satisfies the due process requirements in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
62 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006) (applying Mullane and assessing the
adequacy of the challenged notice by “balancing the interest of the State against the individual interest
sought to be protected” (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sergio
J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1114 (2012) (“Although Mullane did not
engage in the balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, the decision is consistent with an approach
that takes all of the relevant interests at stake into account to compare different procedures.”); Philip
P. Ehrlich, A Balancing Equation for Social Media Publication Notice, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2163, 2178 (2016)
(“Although Mathews and Mullane use different language, both cases create the same cost-benefit test
for courts to evaluate whether parties provided the best notice practicable.”).
63 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28-29
(1976) (“During the 1970s the Supreme Court has undertaken an intensive review of administrative
hearing procedures for conformity with constitutional requirements of due process of law . . . . What
followed was a ‘due process revolution’—a ﬂood of cases seeking to extend, or simply to apply,
Goldberg’s precepts.” (footnote omitted)). But cf. Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1903 (“[T]here is no
necessary connection between Mathews’s due process calculus and the notion that procedural due
process must entail the allocation of primary decisional responsibility to courts.”).
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of the Due Process Clause.64 This dynamic was most evident in the “new
property” context,65 but it extended to more traditional forms of property
and liberty interests as well.
Judicial scrutiny of due process procedures did not always result in
agencies providing additional procedural safeguards, however. In fact,
Goldberg itself arguably prompted a policy reversal that led to less, rather than
more, procedural protections for welfare recipients. In November 1968, two
years before Goldberg was decided, the agency responsible for administering
the federal welfare program proposed regulations requiring state and local
welfare agencies to make available free legal representatives to welfare
recipients in the hearing process.66 The regulations were initially scheduled
to become eﬀective in 1969, but they were delayed and still pending when
Goldberg came before the Court.67 Ultimately, Goldberg held that welfare
recipients have a due process right to be represented by counsel at their
hearings, but not that the government is obliged to provide free counsel to
recipients.68 Following the Court’s decision, the agency revised its
regulations, deleting the mandatory representation provision and limiting the
hearing procedures to those speciﬁcally identiﬁed in Goldberg.69
64 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process—A Study of the Implementation
of Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 726 n.6 (1972)
(“Following Goldberg a number of courts have found state procedures for termination or suspension
of public assistance beneﬁts constitutionally defective.”); see also Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, supra
note 11, at 1323 (“In response to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Goldberg and Mathews, federal, state,
and local administrative agencies adjusted existing procedures and created new ones in order to
satisfy the requirements of due process.”). These developments in due process doctrine were not
always well received. See Kirp, supra note 30, at 842 (observing that “new applications” of due process
doctrine “encountered resistance within the aﬀected bureaucratic and professional organizations,
which f[ou]nd the implementation of procedural norms threatening”).
65 See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing concept
of “new property”); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965) (“The idea of entitlement is simply that when individuals have
insuﬃcient resources to live under conditions of health and decency, society has obligations to
provide support, and the individual is entitled to that support as of right.”).
66 See Fair Hearings—Public Assistance Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,853 (Oct. 30, 1968) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. Ch. II) (proposing regulations requiring state and local welfare agencies to provide
representation at welfare hearings beginning July 1, 1969); 34 Fed. Reg. 1354, 1356 (Jan. 28, 1969) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 220) (“Legal services must be made available to families who desire the
assistance of lawyers at fair hearings and appropriate fee schedules . . . must be established to assure legal
representation when desired.”). Notably, the regulations were issued after the three-judge district court
in Goldberg issued its decision “signalling [sic] the new judicial attitude toward pre-termination notice
and hearing . . . .” Scott, supra note 64, at 729. See generally Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff ’d sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
67 See Fair Hearings: Legal Services; Continuing Assistance, 34 Fed. Reg. 13,595 (Aug. 22, 1969)
(postponing the effective date of regulations requiring representation at welfare hearings to July 1, 1970).
68 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71.
69 See Fair Hearings; Revocation of Regulations, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,591 (June 26, 1970) (codiﬁed
at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3)(iii) (1973)) (removing the mandatory representation provision from the
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Developments in Supreme Court doctrine also inﬂuenced legislation
drafted by Congress. Although most major federal programs had been
enacted by the time the Court’s modern procedural due process doctrine took
shape, not all had. For example, in 1975, in the middle of the due process
revolution, Congress passed landmark legislation that later became known as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.70 The legislation imposed
new requirements on schools serving students with special needs.71 Congress
reasonably anticipated that school administrators’ decisions would be subject
to due process scrutiny72 and mandated a set of procedural safeguards that
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s modern approach to due process.73
Individuals also looked to the courts for clariﬁcation and enforcement of
their procedural due process rights. The late 1960s and 1970s saw an
“explosion” of due process litigation.74 Although the volume of litigation
eventually tapered oﬀ, plaintiﬀs have continued to turn to the courts for
clariﬁcation on whether available procedures comply with the Due Process
Clause and what additional or substitute procedural safeguards might be
required by the Constitution.

ﬁnal regulations). See generally Scott, supra note 64 (discussing pre- and post-Goldberg hearing
regulations). “Whether the implications of the Goldberg requirements or more concrete economic
considerations were responsible for the decision to revoke the free legal representation requirement
is not entirely clear.” Id. at 730.
70 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)
(codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.). In 1990, Congress amended
and renamed this legislation the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Pub. L. No.
101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142-43 (1990) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq.); see also Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Education
Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 444 (2011) (“The IDEA was enacted . . . in the midst of what has
come to be known as the due process revolution.”).
71 Education for All Handicapped Children Act § 612.
72 See Romberg, supra note 70, at 445 (“[N]otions of proceduralism were prominent in the
minds of the Congress that enacted the IDEA . . . .”). Indeed, lower courts had already begun
ﬁnding due process rights in the special education context. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 875-76 (D.D.C. 1972) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254) (holding that plaintiﬀs’ due process
rights were violated); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (holding that plaintiﬀ class of special education students had “established a colorable claim
under the Due Process Clause”).
73 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (explaining that “[b]oth the House and the
Senate Reports attribute the impetus for the [Education for All Handicapped Children] Act and its
predecessors to two federal-court judgments” rendering post-Goldberg due process decisions); see also
Romberg, supra note 70, at 446 (“The due process revolution, as reflected in [two lower court rulings
analyzing the due process rights of students with special needs], was . . . imported into the IDEA itself.”).
74 Friendly, supra note 2, at 1268; see also MASHAW, supra note 2, at 9-10 (noting that “federal
court complaints of procedural due process deprivation in the 1970s showed a 350 percent increase
over the 1960s,” compared to a 70% increase in federal civil litigation of all kinds); Rubin, supra note
33, at 1146 (“The welfare rights movement and related social trends brought a wider variety of
administrative actions to the courts than they had previously seen.”).
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Just as hearing procedures were revised in the wake of Goldberg and the due
process revolution, so too were the notices provided by the government. Agencies
promulgated new regulations establishing detailed standards for notices that were
in line with the policymakers’ understanding of the constitutional requirements.
Those regulations typically focused on the content and timeliness of the notice,
with little detail as to how the notice was to be transmitted. At most, there were
passing references to the “mailing” of the notices.75
Not surprisingly, litigation involving the notice aspect of the Due Process
Clause increased in the wake of Goldberg and the due process revolution. Once
the Supreme Court endorsed an expanded definition of “property” under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,76 the notice that the government provided
before depriving individuals of those “new property” interests came under
constitutional scrutiny for the first time. In cases involving public benefits,
public employment, and other interests, courts fleshed out what the Mullane
“reasonably calculated” standard meant in these various contexts.77 The primary
focus was on the content and timeliness of the notice,78 not on how the notice
was transmitted to the affected individual. To the extent that courts considered
notice transmission at all, they assumed that sending paper notices by mail to
affected individuals was sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.79
C. Critiques of the Modern Approach to Procedural Due Process
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due process
prompted intense criticism.80 Although utilitarian balancing was not entirely
new to the due process analysis,81 scholars assailed the Court’s adoption of such
an approach in Mathews. Some argued that using a cost–benefit approach to
determine which procedures are required by due process dilutes the
Constitution’s protections against procedural unfairness.82 Cynthia Farina
75 See infra notes 136–138 and accompanying text (describing notice requirements contained in
food stamps statute and regulations).
76 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
77 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
78 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.8(h) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Mullane and its progeny).
79 Id.
80 See Rubin, supra note 33, at 1044 (observing, less than a decade after Mathews, that “[t]he
procedural due process doctrine is now the subject of intense debate, with its central meaning
regularly questioned by both courts and commentators”).
81 See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943) (deﬁning “due
process of law” as “a weighing or balancing of the various interests which overlap or come in conﬂict
and a rational reconciling or adjustment”). But cf. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1137 (“Although Justice
Powell stated [in Mathews] that the three factors had been dictated by the Court’s ‘prior decisions,’
they were largely new to due process adjudication.” (footnote omitted)).
82 Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1527 (“When courts accept essentially utilitarian
justiﬁcations for withholding procedural protections, the due process clause ceases to be respected
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characterized Mathews’s use of utilitarian balancing as “deeply troubling,”
asking, “If due process is to mark out and defend a sphere in which the
individual is reliably preserved from the demands of the collective, how can
the extent of the protection the individual receives turn on some calculus
explicitly designed to maximize aggregate welfare?”83 Others, most notably
Jerry Mashaw, criticized the Mathews approach for conceiving of the values of
due process too narrowly,84 underemphasizing “process values,” and ignoring
the complexities and ambiguities present in many procedural systems.85
The interest-balancing approach has also been criticized for being difficult—if
not impossible—to apply.86 As an initial matter, some scholars have argued that
courts—as compared to legislatures and administrative agencies—lack the
institutional competence to engage in this type of cost–benefit analysis.87 Scholars

as a basic right which the individual can assert against the power of government and becomes instead
simply one of the several checks and balances in the separation of powers scheme.”).
83 Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 234 (1991); see also
Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from Domestic and
International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2279 (2013) (“In practice, th[e Mathews] approach tends to
reinforce hierarchies of economic privilege and the status quo of access to justice, as what process is
due rests on the value of that process to society.”); cf. John J. Capowski, Reflecting and Foreshadowing:
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), in THE POVERTY LAW CANON: EXPLORING THE MAJOR CASES 219,
219 (Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (“Mathews is a case that foreshadowed the
rightward political movement in this country.”).
84 See Mashaw, supra note 63, at 46 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis in Eldridge is not informed
by systematic attention to any theory of the values underlying due process review. The approach is
implicitly utilitarian but incomplete, and the Court overlooks alternative theories that might have
yielded fruitful inquiry.”); see also Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 154-56 (1978) (arguing that
Mathews undervalues dignitary interests).
85 Mashaw, supra note 63, at 48; see also Farina, supra note 83, at 235 (arguing that the Mathews
analysis “shares with all cost/beneﬁt assessments the tendency to overlook, or at least underrate,
‘soft’ variables”); Redish & Marshall, supra note 32, at 474 (arguing that the Mathews balancing
approach fails because it is unable to account for “the traditional concerns of procedural justice that
the framers most certainly intended when they shaped the two amendments”); Rubin, supra note 33,
at 1138 (“[T]he [Mathews] criteria themselves focus on subsidiary issues rather than the essence of
the due process guarantee”); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 (2011) (“[T]he
Mathews v. Eldridge formulation, focused on accuracy, does not take other goals that can be assigned
to due process into account.”).
86 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 812 (“Like Hand’s formula, the Mathews formula is
conceptually simple but extremely diﬃcult to apply.”); Mashaw, supra note 63, at 48 (“[T]he
[Mathews] calculus asks unanswerable questions.”); Rubin, supra note 33, at 1138 (“[T]he Mathews
framework presents considerable diﬃculties.”).
87 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 820 (“The complicated nature of the cost–benefit analysis required
by the Mathews test raises serious questions concerning the competence of judges to apply that test.”); see
also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973,
1999 (1996) (“Politically accountable legislatures are far better than courts at determining the
relative social value of the myriad beneﬁts they choose to make available by statute, and agencies
are far better than courts at performing the diﬃcult empirical work required to estimate the costs
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have noted that judges reviewing due process claims rarely have before them the
types of data and empirical information that the three-factor balancing test
requires.88 Indeed, Mathews requires courts to predict the impact of “additional or
substitute procedural safeguards,”89 which typically have not been utilized in the
context at issue.90 Moreover, it is far from clear how courts are to determine the
“weight” of each Mathews factor91 or how to weigh the three factors against each
other.92 As a result, critics claim that the Mathews approach creates uncertainty
about the requirements of due process,93 both for legislators and policymakers

and beneﬁts of alternative decisionmaking procedures.”). Pierce writes, “Courts systematically
overestimate the beneﬁts and underestimate the costs of formal decisionmaking.” Id.
88 See Farina, supra note 83, at 196 (“Although framed in terms that invite quantitative analysis,
the Mathews balance is rarely conducted with empirical evidence.”). Judith Resnik succinctly
explained the problem:
[E]ven as Mathews v. Eldridge prompts a judicial accounting of the bases for a due
process ruling, its veneer of scientiﬁc constraints on judicial judgment can serve to
mask the lack of genuine empiricism. Neither judges nor litigants can identify with
any rigor the actual costs of various procedures, let alone model (or know) the impact
in terms of false positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or diﬀerent
processes . . . . While one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because the
data are missing. Interpretive choices abound.
Resnik, supra note 85, at 158; cf. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1303 (“[F]ive years after Goldberg, we have
so little empirical knowledge how it has worked in its own ﬁeld, let alone in others where its
principles have been applied.”).
89 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
90 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 83, at 235 (“How can the Court predict the number of errors that
would be avoided by, for example, permitting the individual to present oral testimony? Or the cost
to the government that would be entailed? Although in theory quantiﬁable, these factors cannot,
realistically, be quantiﬁed.”).
91 See, e.g., Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1519 (“No scale has been calibrated which
courts, legislators, and administrators can use to sensitively and predictably measure either the
relative severity of deprivations inﬂicted upon individuals or the relative importance of
governmental interests in summary action.”).
92 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 33, at 1138 (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a useful approach
for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are
concerned.”); Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1520 (“[T]here is no method by which the
weight of the individual’s interest in obtaining protective procedures and the weight of the
government’s interest in acting informally—optimistically assuming that each of these can somehow
be accurately measured in isolation from the other—can be compared.”).
93 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 805 (“Application of the Mathews approach to a given class
of disputes has the potential to yield any of a wide range of minimum procedural safeguards
depending on the Justices’ assessment of the three factors encompassed in the Mathews balancing
test.”); Farina, supra note 83, at 196 (“[T]he precise outcome of the balancing in any given case is
virtually impossible to predict . . . .”); Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1519 (“[T]he concept
of ‘weight’ employed in the interest-balancing doctrine is of such a subjective and ambiguous nature
that use of interest balancing necessarily occasions great uncertainty.”); see also PIERCE, supra note
33, at 809 (“Not surprisingly, circuit courts often diﬀer with respect to the results of their
applications of the Mathews test to similar cases.”).
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seeking to comply with the Due Process Clause94 and for individuals unsure
whether they have suffered a violation of their due process rights.95
Despite these critiques and challenges, the interest-balancing approach to
procedural due process endures. The Court has had numerous opportunities
to modify or overturn its due process precedents but has declined to do so. It
has also had occasion to limit the application of Mathews to public beneﬁts
adjudications or “new property” claims, but it has not. To the contrary, it
continues to apply Mathews in new situations that bear little resemblance to
the type of “new property” at issue in that case.96
Just as the Court’s approach to procedural due process claims has remained
stable for decades, so too has the resulting case law. Procedural regimes that
were established or modified in the wake of the due process revolution remain
largely identical today.97 Whether due to evidentiary hurdles created by the
cost–benefit approach or to a growing reluctance among judges to hold
existing procedures unconstitutional and to specify new procedures,98 due
process procedures can appear stuck in the past, despite ever-increasing
changes that arguably bear upon one or more of the Mathews factors.99
There may be reasons to revisit old procedures and redo the due process
analysis with new facts.100 Courts, policymakers, legislatures, and litigants
now have access to new technology, new insights into how procedural systems
function, and new evidence of how individuals use (or fail to use) the
procedures that are available to them. But courts have not been sites for this
94 See, e.g., Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1520 (“[E]xcessive uncertainty as to what the
requirements of due process are may seriously hamper the efforts of legislators and administrators to
fashion governmental programs which comport with due process and yet are efficiently administered.”).
95 See, e.g., id. at 1521 (arguing that the uncertainty and unpredictability created by an interestbalancing approach to procedural due process “may require citizens affected by similar governmental actions
to relitigate repeatedly the issue of whether the minimum requirements of due process have been satisfied”).
96 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-35 (2004) (applying Mathews in case where
a U.S. citizen was detained as an enemy combatant). But see id. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for applying the Mathews test, which was derived from “a case involving . . .
the withdrawal of disability benefits!”); Fallon, supra note 59, at 331 (“Although the Supreme Court has
treated Mathews as furnishing a test for all seasons, it was designed for resolving claims of
entitlement to particular types of administrative, rather than judicial, procedures. Claims of a right
to judicial review raise issues lying beyond the Mathews framework.” (footnote omitted)).
97 See Farina, supra note 83, at 254 (“At the agency level, we have watched programs rigidify around the
contours of entitlement, as constitutional floors become process ceilings.”); Parkin, supra note 11, at 1334-36
(discussing the ossification of due process procedures in the decades after the due process revolution).
98 This is consistent with the broader trend of judges becoming more deferential to
government policy choices and less inclined to micromanage government agencies. See, e.g., Ronald
M. Levin, Administrative Procedure and Judicial Restraint, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 338, 347 (2016)
(“[T]oday’s courts do not seem particularly eager to expand procedural rights in administrative
adjudication . . . .”); see also infra subsection III.C.1.
99 See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 11, at 1336-60 (discussing changes in the facts and circumstances
of welfare programs and welfare recipients following the Goldberg decision).
100 See id. at 1366-74.
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kind of rigorous reevaluation of due process procedures, despite the Supreme
Court’s frequent reminder that “‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not
a technical conception with a ﬁxed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.”101 Procedural innovation is happening, but unlike the
innovations of the 1960s and 1970s, it is not being driven by courts.
II. BOTTOM-UP PROCEDURAL INNOVATION
Not content to wait for courts to reassess longstanding due process
precedents, legislatures, policymakers, and advocates have been seeking
procedural innovations outside of litigation. Some of these innovations are ones
that courts had previously rejected as not required by the Due Process Clause.
Others are procedures that have never been the subject of constitutional
litigation. Either way, the result is that procedural safeguards are evolving
without judicial intervention—or even the threat of judicial intervention.
Despite the detachment from constitutional litigation, much of the rhetoric
associated with these reforms sounds in due process. Proponents frequently
describe the reforms as necessary to ensure that proceedings are fair and
participants are afforded due process. For them, the concept of “due process”
appears to have meaning and power that is not bound by the limits of due process
doctrine. Indeed, in some instances, proponents of procedural reforms describe
the reforms as compelled by due process even when courts have uniformly held
that the Due Process Clause does not in fact require the procedures at issue.
This Part identiﬁes three examples of non-court-driven procedural
reforms: the right to appointed counsel, electronic transmission of notice, and
active judging. The examples represent a new and growing trend in which
procedural reforms and innovations are being driven not by creative and
precedent-setting constitutional litigation, as during the due process
revolution, but rather by reform eﬀorts and experimentation that are
unfolding outside formal due process doctrine.
A. Right to Counsel
Since the due process revolution, the Supreme Court has considered on a
number of occasions whether the Due Process Clause requires the government
to provide a lawyer before depriving an individual of her constitutionally
protected interest. The Court declined to reach the question in Goldberg v. Kelly
as it related to welfare hearings,102 but it could not dodge the issue for long.
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
See 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (“We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination
hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.”). Justice Black,
writing in dissent, asserted that even though the majority decision “requires only the opportunity to have
101
102
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Ultimately, the Court held that due process does not require appointment of
counsel in civil proceedings unless a person’s liberty is at stake,103 and, even
then, procedural safeguards short of a right to counsel can be sufficient.104
Despite the Supreme Court’s hostility towards civil right-to-counsel
claims,105 the idea that the Due Process Clause may require appointment of a
lawyer is a persistent one. With respect to deportation and eviction
proceedings, for example, scholars have put forward various arguments for a
right to appointed counsel rooted in due process. Employing the Court’s
Mathews analysis, they have identiﬁed the various interests at stake, weighed
those interests against each other, and argued that the Due Process Clause
mandates the appointment of counsel. Some argue for a categorical right to
counsel in deportation106 and eviction proceedings,107 while others focus on
the benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing, . . . it is difficult to believe that the same reasoning
process would not require the appointment of counsel, for otherwise the right to counsel is a meaningless
one since these people are too poor to hire their own advocates.” Id. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). His
prediction has not come true.
103 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442 (2011) (“[The] pre-eminent generalization that
emerges from this Court’s precedents on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right
has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation.” (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981))). Compare Turner, 564
U.S. at 448 (holding that there is no right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings for nonsupport
of child), and Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 23 (holding that there is no right to counsel in termination of
parental rights cases), and Wolﬀ v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (holding that there is no
right to counsel in prison discipline cases), with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that
juveniles in delinquency cases have a right to counsel), and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1980) (holding that where the state seeks to transfer an indigent prisoner to a mental health facility
against his will, a “qualiﬁed representative” must be provided).
104 See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447-48 (rejecting plaintiﬀ ’s right-to-counsel argument and holding
that a set of “substitute procedural safeguards” can satisfy due process even when the plaintiﬀ ’s
liberty is at stake); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the majority as holding
that a prisoner involuntarily transferred to a mental health facility has a right to “qualiﬁed and
independent assistance” but not necessarily an attorney).
105 This hostility contrasts, of course, with the Court’s right-to-counsel jurisprudence in the
criminal context. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that indigent
defendants in state criminal proceedings have a right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
106 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1629-30 (2010); Beth J. Werlin,
Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 393, 395 (2000); William Haney, Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11
HARV. INT’L L.J. 177, 185 (1970).
107 See, e.g., Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509-18 (2004); Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize
a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 558
(1988); Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must Have a
Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 699, 700 (2006); Steven Gunn, Note,
Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385,
421 (1995); Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New
York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 538-53 (1991). See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Sheltering
Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 187 (2009)
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the due process rights of particular subgroups.108 Such subgroups in the
immigration context include noncitizens who are asylum seekers,109 who lack
mental competency,110 who are juveniles or unaccompanied minors,111 and who
are lawful permanent residents,112 among others.113 Similar subgroups have
been identiﬁed in the eviction context as well.114 The academic literature thus
reﬂects a persistent eﬀort to argue for a right to counsel under the Mathews
approach to procedural due process.

(summarizing arguments presented by advocates who seek to establish a right to counsel for indigent
tenants in eviction proceedings).
108 See Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 287-88 (2014)
(considering the due process rights of subgroups of individuals with diﬀerent procedural needs than
the typical individual in a particular procedural context).
109 See John R. Mills, Kristen M. Echemendia & Stephen Yale-Loehr, “Death Is Different” and a
Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 363 (2009); Nimrod Pitsker, Comment, Due Process
for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counsel for Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169, 171 (2007).
110 See Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in
Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 377 (2011); Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for Appointed
Counsel in Immigration Proceedings: Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 915, 940-53 (2016);
Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 523, 558 (2012); Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration
Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1675-78 (2013); Helen Eisner, Comment, Disabled, Defenseless, and Still
Deportable: Why Deportation Without Representation Undermines Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled
Immigrants, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 511, 514-36 (2011); Christopher Klepps, Note, What Kind of “Process” Is
This?: Solutions to the Case-by-Case Approach in Deportation Proceedings for Mentally Incompetent Non-Citizens,
30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 545, 547 (2012).
111 See Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportation with Inadequate Due Process: The
Devastating Consequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3 DUKE
F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 103-05 (2011); Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Be Heard: Voicing the Due
Process Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41,44 (2011);
Benjamin Good, Note, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 109,
128-47 (2014); see also Susan Hazeldean, Confounding Identities: The Paradox of LGBT Children Under
Asylum Law, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 373, 417-32 (2011) (arguing for a due process right to counsel
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) children and young adults seeking asylum).
112 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J.
2394, 2414 (2013); Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note
110, at 1674-75; see also Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63,
68 (2012) (arguing for a due process right to counsel for lawful permanent residents who are detained
during their deportation proceedings); Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right
to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 116 (2008) (listing the ways in which
detention impacts a noncitizen’s ability to eﬀectively defend against removal).
113 See, e.g., Christen Chapman, Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1529, 1554-69 (2011) (arguing for due process right to counsel for individuals who are statutorily
eligible to seek relief from removal); David A. Robertson, An Opportunity to Be Heard: The Right to
Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1037-40 (1988) (same).
114 See, e.g., Meghan P. Carter, Comment, How Evictions from Subsidized Housing Routinely
Violate the Rights of Persons with Mental Illness, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 118, 136-40 (2010) (arguing
that individuals with mental disabilities who are facing eviction from subsidized housing have a due
process right to appointed counsel).
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Arguments for a due process right to counsel have made no headway in the
courts,115 but that is not the end of the story. Recent nonlitigation efforts in
New York City have succeeded in guaranteeing counsel for indigent individuals
appearing in deportation and eviction proceedings. First, beginning in 2014,
the New York City Council began to fund the provision of counsel to all
detained noncitizens with cases pending in the local immigration court.116
Then, in 2017, the City Council established a right-to-counsel program for all
indigent tenants defending against eviction in the city’s housing courts.117
115 See, e.g., C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that there is no
due process right to appointed counsel for noncitizen minors in immigration deportation
proceedings), rehearing en banc granted by 904 F.3d 642 (2018); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d
565, 568 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that noncitizens do not have a categorical right to governmentappointed counsel in immigration deportation proceedings); N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Johnson, 565
N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (App. Term 1990) (rejecting a due process right to counsel in residential tenant
eviction proceedings); cf. Blatch ex rel. Clay v. Hernandez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 595, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(ﬁnding a due process violation in a case brought by a class of public housing tenants with mental
disabilities); Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG, 2013 WL 3674492, at *3-9 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (holding that a class of detained noncitizens with mental disabilities has a right
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to appointed counsel in immigration deportation
proceedings, without reaching the due process claim).
116 See Universal Representation for Immigrants Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/projects/universal-representation-for-immigrants-facing-deportation/learn-more
[https://perma.cc/ULM5-NVSK] (describing the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project); Lindsay
Nash, Universal Representation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 503, 510-13 (2018) (same).
Since the universal representation program began in New York City, other jurisdictions have
created similar systems. See NINA SIULC & KAREN BERBERICH, VERA INST. JUST., A YEAR OF
BEING SAFE: INSIGHTS FROM THE SAFE NETWORK’S FIRST YEAR 1 n.2 (Nov. 2018),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/a-year-of-beingsafe/legacy_downloads/a-year-of-being-safe.pdf (describing the expansion of universal representation
programs to Oakland and Alameda County, CA; Sacramento, CA; Santa Ana, CA; Denver, CO;
Austin, TX; San Antonio, TX; Dane County, WI; Chicago, IL; Columbus, OH; Atlanta, GA;
Baltimore, MD; and Prince George’s County, MD).
117 See N.Y. City Local Law No. 136, § 1 (2017) (amending local law to provide legal services for
tenants who are subject to eviction proceedings); Press Release, Office of the Mayor of N.Y.C., Mayor
de Blasio Signs Legislation to Provide Low-Income New Yorkers with Access to Counsel for
Wrongful Evictions (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/547-17/mayor-deblasio-signs-legislation-provide-low-income-new-yorkers-access-counsel-for#/0
[https://perma.cc/4ZSW-ARJG] (describing the city’s efforts to ensure legal representation in
housing court). One year after its passage, there are efforts to amend the law to expand eligibility for
legal representation. See Andrew Denney, NYC Council Considering Bill to Further Expand Tenants’ Right
to Counsel, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/09/14/nyccouncil-considering-bill-to-further-expand-tenants-right-to-counsel/?slreturn=20190231114350
(describing introduction of bill that would expand eligibility to tenants who are at 400 percent of the
poverty level or below).
Since New York City began its program, San Francisco, CA, and Newark, NJ, have adopted similar
programs for tenants in eviction proceedings. See J.K. Dineen, SF’s Measure F Wins, Will Give TaxFunded Legal Help to Tenants Facing Eviction, S.F. CHRON. (Jun. 5, 2018),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/SF-Measure-F-to-give-tax-funded-legal-help-to12970924.php [https://perma.cc/7K6V-HJ7B] (reporting on approval of a San Francisco ballot initiative
that guarantees counsel for tenants in eviction proceedings regardless of the tenant’s income); Newark,
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One might view these right-to-counsel programs as an example of pure
policy development. After all, local governments routinely identify problems
of concern, develop solutions, and appropriate funding for implementation of
those solutions. From one perspective, that is what happened when New York
City went ahead and guaranteed counsel in these deportation and eviction
cases. Proponents of the right to counsel presented testimony and proposals
as part of coordinated advocacy campaigns, legislators and policymakers
considered the alternatives, and ultimately the city’s legislature took action.
Yet there is another way to look at these reforms. Even though they did
not involve litigation or even the threat of litigation, proponents of the reforms
framed the debate in terms of fairness and the right to “due process.”118 They
did this even though many of them were lawyers and were well aware that no
courts—let alone the Supreme Court—have held that the Due Process Clause
requires the provision of counsel in deportation or eviction proceedings.119
Nonetheless, the proponents understood that the concept of “due process” has
meaning and power that extends beyond Supreme Court jurisprudence, and
they marshaled that power in support of their reform efforts.
In addition to establishing a right to counsel in deportation and eviction
proceedings, the New York City reforms have been accompanied by a commitment
to research and evaluation. Careful analysis of the value of legal representation has

N.J., Ordinance 18-0673 (Dec. 19, 2018) (guaranteeing counsel to tenants with incomes below 200% of
the federal poverty level who are in eviction proceedings). Bills that would create similar guarantees
are pending in additional jurisdictions. See S. 652, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019)
(proposing to guarantee counsel in Connecticut for tenants making less than $50,000 per year who are
in an eviction proceeding); H. 1537, 191st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); H. 3456, 191st Gen.
Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); S. 913, 191st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019) (providing a right to
counsel in eviction proceedings in Massachusetts for persons who are “indigent”).
118 For an example related to eviction proceedings, see Samar Khurshid, Push to Expand Your Right
to
an
Attorney
Gains
Momentum,
GOTHAM
GAZETTE
(Feb.
12,
2015),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/government/5571-push-to-expand-your-right-to-an-attorney-gainsmomentum-levine-mark-viverito-de-blasio [https://perma.cc/4ZSW-ARJG] (quoting Andrew
Scherer’s statement that “[i]t’s impossible for an unrepresented tenant to navigate the court system
without having an attorney and it’s a matter of fundamental due process”).
For examples related to deportation proceedings, see Press Release, Vera Institute of Justice, New
York State Becomes First in the Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants Detained and Facing
Deportation, (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-firstin-the-nation-to-provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation
[https://perma.cc/VS7J-A37A] (quoting proponents of right-to-counsel program stating that it will “help
thousands of immigrant families receive due process,” “ensure due process,” and “provid[e] a basic level of
due process”); Roque Planas & Elise Foley, De Blasio Under Fire for Plan to Keep Some Immigrants out of Legal
Aid Program, HUFFPOST (June 2, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/de-blasio-under-fire-forrestricting-immigrants-access-to-lawyers_us_59318c3ce4b02478cb9af54b [https://perma.cc/JQ8X-ATUP]
(quoting a letter from twenty-seven City Council members referring to Mayor De Blasio’s changes to the
right-to-counsel program as undermining part of “our city’s commitment to due process for all”).
119 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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been a part of the immigration program since its inception.120 Using quantitative
analyses of administrative and program data, evaluators have studied the program’s
impact on the noncitizens who receive representation, their families, and local
budgets.121 The eviction right-to-counsel initiative was similarly grounded in
extensive research and evaluation,122 and the recently enacted legislation imposes
robust reporting requirements upon the city agency responsible for administering
the program.123 Among other things, the city must track both case outcomes and
the costs of the program.124 Thus, both right-to-counsel programs are generating
detailed and extensive data about the costs and benefits of guaranteed counsel.125
B. Electronic Notice
A second example of non-court-driven procedural reform targets the
notice that the Due Process Clause requires before an individual is deprived
of a constitutionally protected interest. There is a long line of Supreme Court
cases ruling on the constitutionality of diﬀerent forms of notice.126 Notice can
be provided orally or in writing or both; it can be transmitted in person or by
telephone, mail, or electronic means. Some due process cases involve

120 See Peter L. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 360 (2011) (describing the goals of the Study Group on
Immigrant Representation’s research); see also PETER L. MARKOWITZ ET AL., STUDY GROUP ON
IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO
NEW
YORK
IMMIGRANTS
IN
REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
1
(2012),
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/New%20York%20Immigrant%20Representation%20Study%2
0II%20-%20NYIRS%20Steering%20Committee%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKX4-WAND]
(proposing data-driven solutions for the immigration representation crisis).
121 See JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE NEW
YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
ON
FAMILY
AND
COMMUNITY
UNITY
5
(2017),
https://www.vera.org/publications/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project-evaluation
[https://perma.cc/DU4U-D8VH] (analyzing the impact of NYIFUP).
122 See, e.g., STOUT RISIUS ROSS, INC., THE FINANCIAL COST AND BENEFITS OF
ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN EVICTION PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTRO 214-A 2-6
(2016),
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/SRR_Report_Financial_Cost_and_Benefits_of_Establ
ishing_a_Right_to_Counsel_in_Eviction_Proceedings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VM87-FEDJ]
(providing a cost–benefit analysis of the proposed law).
123 See N.Y. City Local Law No. 136 (2017) (establishing annual reporting requirements).
124 Id.
125 See OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, N.Y.C. HUM. RESOURCES ADMIN., UNIVERSAL ACCESS
TO LEGAL SERVICES: A REPORT ON YEAR ONE OF IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ-UA-2018-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D6P-Q7GH] (summarizing research on first full year of implementation of New
York City eviction representation program); STAVE ET AL., supra note 121, at 5 (analyzing the impact
of NYIFUP).
126 See supra Section I.B.
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challenges to the timeliness127 and adequacy of the notice,128 while others
involve the way in which the notice was sent to the individual.129 As discussed
in Part I, the Supreme Court analyzes notice claims under Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust, a 1950 decision holding that the government must
provide notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and aﬀord them an
opportunity to present their objections.”130
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s relatively stable notice jurisprudence,
innovations are nonetheless underway. Changes in technology are raising new
questions about how notice can be provided. For decades, transmitting notice
by mail has been the standard, constitutionally sound practice,131 but new
127 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing plaintiﬀs’
claims that a social services agency failed to provide timely and adequate notice of public assistance,
food stamps, and Medicaid determinations); Doston v. Duﬀy, 732 F. Supp. 857, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(ﬁnding to be timely a notice that is mailed at least ten days before the eﬀective date of the proposed
termination or suspension of beneﬁts).
128 See, e.g., Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1986) (defining “adequate” notice and
describing its purpose as providing an individual with sufficient information to defend his or her
interests); Doston, 732 F. Supp. at 872-73 (holding that a notice is inadequate if it is “unintelligible,
confusing, or misleading” or does not “meaningfully inform” the recipient of his or her rights); Ortiz v.
Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1061 (D. Del. 1985) (explaining that in the welfare context “[a]t a minimum,
due process requires the agency to explain, in terms comprehensible to the claimant, exactly what the
agency proposes to do and why the agency is taking this action”), aff ’d, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
129 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 230 (2006) (deeming notice by mail to be
insuﬃcient in a case involving seizure of house due to delinquent payment of taxes where “the
government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineﬀective triggered an
obligation on the government’s part to take additional steps to eﬀect notice”); Dusenbery v. United
States, 534 U.S. 161, 168-69 (2002) (ﬁnding no due process violation where notice of forfeiture was
sent by certiﬁed mail and placed in a newspaper); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum
constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely aﬀect the liberty or property
interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and
address are reasonably ascertainable.”); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453 (1982) (ruling that
solely posting notice of eviction action on the door of an apartment in a public housing unit violated
due process); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1962) (holding that publication
in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to apprise a property owner of condemnation
proceedings when his name and address were readily ascertainable).
130 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). As the Court later
explained, “assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of
the State’ against ‘the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”
Jones, 547 U.S. at 229 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
131 The Supreme Court has long recognized that transmitting notice via mail satisﬁes due
process. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 800 (“Notice by mail or other means as
certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely aﬀect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in
commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable.”); Greene, 456 U.S. at 453
(holding that posting notice of eviction action on the door of an apartment in a public housing unit
violates due process); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (“[T]he mails today are recognized as an eﬃcient and
inexpensive means of communication.”).
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methods of communication are creating new opportunities for conveying
notice in ways that are potentially faster, cheaper, more eﬀective, and less
administratively burdensome.132
Administrative agencies are now experimenting with various forms of
electronic notice, such as transmitting notice by email, text message, online
portal, or some combination of these options. The federal Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps)
provides an illuminating example of this trend. SNAP is one of the nation’s
largest public beneﬁt programs, with over forty million Americans currently
receiving some amount of nutrition assistance.133 Because food stamps, like
many other public beneﬁts, are considered “property” under the Due Process
Clause,134 the government must provide notice of any denial or termination
of a household’s beneﬁts.135 The federal food stamp statute, which established
the program and imposes obligations on state administrators, makes only
limited reference to “notice,”136 and the federal implementing regulations
focus on the timeliness and adequacy of the notice that is provided.137 Aside
Of course, sending notice by mail is not always constitutionally sound. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that notice by mail regarding forfeiture of an
automobile connected to crime was inadequate when notice was mailed to the individual’s home at a
time that the government knew that the individual was incarcerated); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351
U.S. 141, 146 (1956) (holding that notice of foreclosure by mail and publication was inadequate when
government was aware that the property owner was mentally incompetent and did not have a guardian).
132 See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 62, at 2165 (“Many notice plans now include a social media
component, and most courts allow parties to provide publication notice using targeted social media banner
ads.” (footnote omitted)); Claire M. Specht, Note, Text Message Service of Process—No LOL Matter: Does
Text Message Service of Process Comport with Due Process?, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1929, 1931 (2012) (noting that
“[s]ervice of process by text message offers many advantages,” including efficiency, cost-effectiveness, ease,
and accessibility). See generally Christine P. Bartholomew, E-Notice, 68 DUKE L.J. 217 (2018) (discussing
new forms of notice in class-action litigation).
133 See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
FOOD
&
NUTRITION
SERV.
(Feb.
2,
2019),
https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/ﬁles/pd/SNAPsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KP8-CL3Q].
134 See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (“Food-stamp beneﬁts, like the welfare beneﬁts
at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, ‘are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualiﬁed to receive
them.’ Such entitlements are appropriately treated as a form of ‘property’ protected by the Due
Process Clause . . . .” (citations omitted)).
135 See id. (“[T]he procedures that are employed in determining whether an individual may
continue to participate in the [food stamp] program must comply with the commands of the
Constitution.”). Courts have considered numerous due process challenges to food stamp notices.
E.g., Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 1975); Barry v. Corrigan, 79 F. Supp. 3d 712, 720
(E.D. Mich. 2015), aﬀ ’d 834 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2016); Febus v. Gallant, 866 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D. Mass.
1994); Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Del. 1985), aﬀ ’d 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986);
Dingle v. Lam, 434 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (D. Haw. 1977).
136 See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2012) (outlining requirements of a state plan of operation, which does
not itself mandate any notice of adverse agency action but merely assumes that a hearing request by a
household aggrieved by a state agency’s action will be preceded by “individual notice of agency action”).
137 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.13 (2019) (establishing requirements for notice of adverse agency action).
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from a few references in the regulations to termination or denial notices being
“mailed” to the household,138 there are no instructions concerning how notice
is to be transmitted to participants in the program.
Not surprisingly, since the beginning of the program, state agencies have
provided food stamp notices by mail. In recent years, however, agencies have
sought waivers to allow them to shift from mailing paper notices to issuing
notices electronically.139 The federal government began approving these
waiver requests in 2011, allowing states to issue notices to households using
an online account on a secure network or portal and to cease mailing paper
notices to a household’s physical address.140 Then, in late 2017, the federal
government went one step further, eliminating the need for states to obtain
a waiver, instead making the e-notice option available to all states, provided
that certain conditions are met.141
The shift to electronic transmission of notices is being driven not by courts
engaging in the type of interest-balancing required by due process doctrine,
but rather by government agencies employing a similar balancing approach.142
According to the federal government, it changed its policy concerning notice
transmission for two reasons. First, it cited “the positive data reported from
currently approved e-notice waivers,” noting that since the first e-notice
waivers were approved, “stakeholders including State agencies, SNAP
households, and advocacy groups, have reported that e-notices may provide
several administrative and customer service related benefits,”143 including
“reduced printing and mailing costs, faster receipt of notices, fewer lost notices
and easier access to them within the portal, and decreases in returned mail for

138 See, e.g., id. § 273.13(a)(1) (referring to notice as timely if it “includes at least 10 days from the
date the notice is mailed to the date upon which the action becomes effective”); id. § 273.10(g)(1)(ii)
(referring to an action “taken within 30 days of the date the notice of denial was mailed”).
139 See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Servs., Electronic
Notice
Waivers
and
Options
1
(Nov.
3,
2017),
https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Memo-Electronic-Notice-and-Other-Options-11317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/855D-MXCK] [hereinafter Memo on Electronic Notice] (noting the availability of
e-notice waivers, “which allow States to provide designated noticed to households through an online
account on a secure website or portal instead of mailing paper notices to physical addresses”).
140 Id. at 1.
141 Id. at 1-2. The notice policy did not include the use of text messages as a substitute for
mailed notices. See id. at 2 (“Text messages diﬀer from email and mail correspondence in important
ways, the most important of which is that the sender does not get feedback (returned mail or
undeliverable email) indicating if the recipient did not receive the information that was sent.”).
142 This cost–beneﬁt analysis is similar to the analysis employed by courts when considering
whether notice complies with the Due Process Clause. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006)
(“[A]ssessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of the State’
against ‘the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))).
143 Memo on Electronic Notice, supra note 139, at 1.
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households who lack a fixed permanent address.”144 Second, the federal
government highlighted its “re-evaluation of the regulations regarding notice
issuance in light of current technology.”145
The federal government has made clear that this kind of procedural
innovation depends on data concerning its costs and beneﬁts. For example, it
has declined to give blanket approval to notice via text message, stating that
state agencies wishing to use solely text messages “must continue to request
waiver approval and include appropriate plans to evaluate the impact of the
proposed alternative procedure.”146 Thus, the federal government has
demonstrated its willingness not to lock in certain forms of notice and to
continue to be open to new ideas based on evidence of how they operate.
C. Active Judging
A third example of non-court-driven procedural reform focuses on the
role of the judge when court proceedings involve one or more unrepresented
litigants. Civil courts in the United States have been suﬀering from a “pro se
crisis” for decades.147 Even when basic human needs are at issue—for
example, shelter, sustenance, health, and child custody—a high percentage of
people are unable to aﬀord to hire an attorney to represent them.148 The
144 Id. But see SNAP Policy Update: DTA Pilot on e-Notification for SNAP and Cash Clients; Update
List of DTA Local Oﬃce Contact Information, MASS. LEGAL SERVS. (Jan. 14, 2014),
https://www.masslegalservices.org/content/snap-policy-update-dta-pilot-e-notiﬁcation-snap-andcash-clients-update-list-dta-local [https://perma.cc/78TJ-67CB] (describing problems with
Massachusetts’s e-notiﬁcation system, such as lack of reliable Internet access, language barriers, and
Internet safety concerns).
145 Memo on Electronic Notice, supra note 139, at 1.
146 Id. at 2.
147 See, e.g., JOY MOSES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S PRO SE CRISIS AND HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
UNREPRESENTED
LITIGANTS
3
(2011),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/objection.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6ZT-Q437] (noting that “[t]he
number of low and moderate-income litigants representing themselves in civil matters has increased in
recent decades” and naming this trend a “Pro Se Crisis”); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to
Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 883 (2009) (“In many courts that handle housing,
bankruptcy, immigration, small claims, and family matters, pro se litigants are not the exception but
the rule, and the recent economic downturn has increased their presence.”); Jessica K. Steinberg,
Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 749-51 (2015) (reporting that up
to ninety percent of litigants in certain state systems appear unrepresented and concluding that “the
pro se crisis is immense”).
148 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (104-REVISED) 1 (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
104_revised_final_aug_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMD4-RUPM] (discussing need for governmentfunded legal representation for low-income individuals appearing in proceedings involving “basic human
needs”); LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
30
(2017),
OF
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS4X-
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absence of lawyers can undermine the American adversarial model of
adjudication, which relies on the parties, through their legal representatives,
to present evidence and make legal arguments.149 Without lawyers
representing parties, there are real questions about whether court proceedings
can be fundamentally fair.
Due process doctrine and theory have not historically been focused on
how judges run proceedings in the courtroom.150 To be sure, the Supreme
Court has considered numerous cases in which pro se parties in civil matters
sought a due process right to appointed counsel.151 However, the Court in
those cases did not consider the role of judges in ensuring the fairness of the
proceedings, with one recent and signiﬁcant exception: the Court’s 2011
decision in Turner v. Rogers.152
The Court’s decision in Turner is a small but important step toward
connecting the requirements of due process with the role of the judge in cases
involving pro se litigants. In Turner, the Court, applying Mathews, rejected
the petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a government-appointed
lawyer under the Due Process Clause because he was in danger of being
incarcerated due to unpaid child support payments.153 However, the Court
also held that the state must provide “‘substitute procedural safeguards,’
which, if employed together, can signiﬁcantly reduce the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty.”154 The Court identiﬁed a handful of alternative
procedures, each of which implicates the role of the judge: giving pro se
defendants more information about the “critical issue” to be decided at the
hearing, using a form to collect information about that issue, giving
defendants an opportunity to respond to questions about the issue at the
hearing, and making an express ﬁnding on that issue.155 Thus, in the speciﬁc

GJNA] (“[L]ow-income Americans receive inadequate or no professional legal help for 86% of their civil
legal problems in a given year.”).
149 See generally Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1975) (acknowledging the existing imperfections of the American adversarial system); Norman
W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1377 (2008) (opining that the adversarial system itself does not create a problem but that the failure
of lawyers within that system does).
150 The Court has, of course, explored the related but distinct question of judicial bias. See
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (holding that due process requires a
judge’s recusal when the likelihood of bias “is too high to be constitutionally tolerable” (quoting
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining
that due process guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on the part of the judge).
151 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
152 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011).
153 See id. at 444-48.
154 Id. at 447 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (citation omitted).
155 Id. at 447-48.
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proceedings considered in Turner, pro se individuals have a due process right
to a judge who does not sit passively at the hearing.156
The academic literature has seen a similar increase in attention to the role
of the judge. At the height of the due process revolution, scholars paid little
attention to the role of the judge as a component of procedural due process.
For example, in his seminal article on what type of hearing the Due Process
Clause requires, Judge Henry Friendly identiﬁed eleven “elements” of a fair
hearing, ranking them in order of importance.157 Aside from a requirement
that the judge be unbiased,158 Friendly omitted any reference to how the judge
actually presides over the proceedings.159 Although he did argue for an
“investigatory model” rather than an adversarial model for certain hearings,
Friendly did not even suggest that such an approach to judging might be
required by the Due Process Clause.160
Even without clear direction from due process doctrine, ideas about the
role of the judge are changing. With the support of a growing body of
academic and policy literature,161 courts are experimenting with an “active
156 Id. The impact of this aspect of Turner’s holding is unclear. See, e.g., Ashley Robertson, Note,
Revisiting Turner v. Rogers, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2017) (arguing that Turner’s “substitute
procedural safeguards do not adequately offset the risk of wrongful incarceration”).
157 See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1279-95.
158 Id. at 1279-80.
159 Id. at 1278-95.
160 Id. at 1289-91.
161 See, e.g., RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE
GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS 109-12 (2002) (suggesting ways for
judges to facilitate pro se litigation); Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving
Self-Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGES’ J., Winter 2003, at 16, 45-46 (recommending that judges
prepare more intensely, provide more guidelines, and accept more informal evidence and testimony
in cases involving pro se litigants); see also Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the
Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 670-74 (2006) (recommending a survey of the strategies
of judges who successfully mitigate diﬃculties faced by pro se litigants in New York City’s Housing
Court); Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV.
1227, 1233-34 (2010) (arguing that court reform would be more eﬀective than increasing funding for
appointed counsel); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 987-88 (2012) (surveying the range of bottom-up
pro se court reform); Carpenter, supra note 15, at 649, 651 (noting that “[a] critical mass of scholars
and experts now argue that court reform, including reform of the judge’s role, could help solve the
pro se crisis in civil justice”); Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the
Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368-69 (2008) (focusing
on the changing judicial role in cases with unrepresented litigants); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial
Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 330 (2010)
(arguing that failing to address the lack of access to justice for the poor is judicial abdication of the
central mission of justice); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access
to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 969, 970 (2004) (applying a market perspective to argue that a changing judicial role would
be more eﬀective than increasing funding for counsel and demanding more pro bono hours of
lawyers); Rhode, supra note 147, at 885 (explaining how the concerns of judges regarding the
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judging”162 approach to legal proceedings where one or both of the parties are
unrepresented by counsel.163 There is no universally recognized deﬁnition for
“active judging,”164 nor is there much guidance for judges seeking to take on
an active role in pro se litigation.165 In the leading scholarly treatment of
active judging, Anna Carpenter explains that it typically operates in one or
more of three “dimensions”: accommodating pro se litigants by adjusting
procedures, explaining the law and hearing process, and eliciting information
to develop the record.166 These judicial interventions are aimed at promoting
fairness for pro se litigants, improving the quality of judicial rulings, and
increasing the eﬃciency of court proceedings, while at the same time
maintaining the judge’s neutrality and impartiality.167
The recent uptick in active judging is not being driven by changes in due
process doctrine. As a general matter, due process case law continues to say
little about the judge’s role in cases involving pro se litigants.168 In fact, many
cases hold that judges have no obligation to treat pro se litigants any
diﬀerently than represented parties.169 And while experimentation with
active judging resembles the kinds of procedural safeguards that the Supreme
Court held in Turner to be required by the Due Process Clause, neither the
Supreme Court nor lower courts have extended this aspect of Turner’s holding
beyond the proceedings at issue in that case.

appearance of impartiality have inhibited potential reforms); Jeﬀrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony
Alﬁeri & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and
Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 60-61 (2012) (describing how court
simpliﬁcation eﬀorts have become a major feature of reforms).
162 Anna Carpenter explains, “Reform proposals go by diﬀerent names, such as ‘active judging,’
‘aﬃrmative judging,’ ‘engaged judging,’ and ‘engaged neutrality,’ but all refer to a model of judging
that sets aside traditional judicial passivity in favor of some form of judicial intervention or activity
to assist people without counsel.” Carpenter, supra note 15, at 649-50. Like Carpenter, this Article
uses the term “active judging” to refer to these reforms.
163 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 665 (“On the ground, while many judges likely hew to the
passive norm, limited evidence suggests some judges are beginning to alter their practices in
response to the rise of pro se litigation.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role
Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 937-43 (arguing that judicial departures
from adversarial procedures are widespread).
164 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 656 (ﬁnding, based on an empirical study, that “there is no
single model of, or approach to, active judging”).
165 See id. at 663-64 (“[W]hile some authorities have taken a permissive stance on active
judging, there is little in the way of speciﬁc guidance on the scope, nature, and objectives of a judge’s
role in pro se litigation.”).
166 Id. at 667-72.
167 Id. at 662-63 (discussing arguments in support of active judging); see also Barton, supra note 161, at
1273 (discussing how even relatively modest reforms can impact the pro se litigant’s experience positively).
168 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 163, at 927 (“[O]nly a few dozen opinions address the
intersection of pro se litigation and adversary norms.”).
169 See, e.g., id. at 927 (listing cases where courts emphasized “the norm of party control”).
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Still, it is impossible to ignore the links between active judging and
procedural due process. When proponents describe the goals of active
judging, they typically refer to ensuring fair procedures, fair hearings, and
fair opportunities for pro se litigants to participate in the proceedings.170
Similar language appears in a recent revision to the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct that arguably authorizes active judging.171 These invocations of
“fairness” sound in the Constitution’s due process guarantee.172 Indeed, that
is what enabled the Supreme Court in Turner to ﬁnd a constitutional violation
where a judge sat back passively and did not make the kind of interventions
in the proceedings that would have aﬀorded the pro se litigant a process that
comported with due process.173
Along with the recent increase in active judging have come efforts to measure
its impact. A growing number of scholars are beginning to engage in this
empirical research.174 Although there is currently limited evidence of the costs
and benefits of specific active judging practices, studies are aiming to reveal the
impact on pro se litigants, judges, and the civil justice system as a whole.175

170 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 15, at 658 (“Central to th[e] vision [of justice reform given
the pro se crisis] is an active judge, one who maintains impartiality while promoting access and
fairness for pro se parties by making procedural adjustments, explaining law and the hearing process,
and eliciting information to develop the record.”).
171 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 r. 2.2 cmt.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)
(“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se
litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.” (emphasis added)). The ABA report on
the rule change uses similar language. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE
MODEL
CODE
OF
JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
47
(2007),
THE
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/house_report.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PZ4-8VZR]. (“[B]y leveling the playing ﬁeld, . . . judges ensure that pro
se litigants receive the fair hearing to which they are entitled.” (emphasis added)).
172 See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The essence of
procedural due process is a fair hearing.”); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase ‘due process of law,’
there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial . . . .”).
173 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448 (2011).
174 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 684-707 (summarizing the results of a study of a majority pro
se court where controlling law supports active judging); see also id. at 672 (“We do not have sufficient
empirical data to make categorical statements about how judges behave in pro se cases, let alone
studies that tell us about the effectiveness of particular active judging practices.”). See generally Anna
E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil Judges,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 249 (calling for more research focused on state civil courts and judges).
175 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 672 (“Existing research suggests that jurisdictions, courts,
and individual judges diﬀer in meaningful ways in how they apply the law and enforce procedure
. . . [when] they engage with pro se litigants.”); Carpenter et al., supra note 174, at 252 (“The data
[scholars] do have about state courts point to a radical and ongoing transformation in the civil justice
system, a transformation both easy to observe and largely overlooked.”).
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III. REUNIFYING AND REVIVING DUE PROCESS THROUGH DIALOGUE
The innovations described in Part II are just a few examples of the
procedural experimentation that is currently underway. These innovations
are taking root in diﬀerent jurisdictions and across unrelated legal contexts,
and experimentation in one place is inspiring similar reforms elsewhere.176
Despite their diversity, the innovations share three important characteristics:
they involve foundational elements of procedural due process (notice, the
right to counsel, and the role of the judge), they are not the product of due
process litigation, and they are portrayed as mandated by due process. Thus,
they are simultaneously all about due process while also disconnected from
due process theory and doctrine.
What do these innovations mean for the future of procedural due process?
Should due process doctrine evolve to include innovations like these? If so,
how? Drawing on two fundamental aspects of procedural due process—the
flexibility and adaptability that is deeply rooted in American due process
jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due
process claims—this Part argues for revival and reunification of due process
through what I call a “dialogic” approach to procedural due process. Section A
identifies the growing divergence between procedural innovations that are not
prompted by litigation, on the one hand, and the relatively stagnant due
process theory and doctrine, on the other hand. Then, drawing on the flexible
nature of due process and the Supreme Court’s modern approach to evaluating
due process claims, Section B argues that this divergence can be reconciled
through dialogue between due process doctrine and the innovations that are
underway. This Part then concludes with Section C, which anticipates and
responds to objections and counterarguments that may be triggered by a
dialogic approach to procedural due process. In sum, this Part offers both a
justification and a roadmap for reinvigorating procedural due process doctrine
at a time when non-court-driven experimentation is on the rise.

176 See, e.g., Matt Krupnick, “People Will Sign Anything”: How Legal Odds Are Stacked Against the
Evicted, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/24/evictedtenants-landlords-lawyers-disparity-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/5FAV-BQNF] (reporting that
since New York City adopted right-to-counsel legislation for eviction cases in 2017, “San Francisco,
Philadelphia and Baltimore all are testing or considering right-to-counsel programs, as are smaller
cities such as Santa Rosa, California”). There are numerous organizations, coalitions, and working
groups focused on bringing the strategies and lessons of right-to-counsel advocacy to jurisdictions
with no such programs. See, e.g., NAT’L COALITION FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS.,
http://civilrighttocounsel.org [https://perma.cc/7JXG-JWEJ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2019) (advocating
for “a right to counsel in key areas like child custody, guardianship of adults, termination of parental
rights, and incarceration for failure to pay criminal fees and fines”).
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A. Divergence
As discussed in Part II, there is a growing divergence between what courts say
that the Due Process Clause requires and the procedural safeguards that are
actually available to affected individuals. Indeed, in some instances, the procedures
that are now available are ones that courts have held, either explicitly or implicitly,
not to be required by due process.177 In other instances, the new procedures have
never before been ordered by courts in constitutional litigation.178
Although government oﬃcials are free to—and often do—provide more
procedural protections than are required by the Constitution,179 the growing
divergence is nonetheless noteworthy. First, some of the new procedural
innovations are variations on bedrock elements of procedural due process: the
right to counsel, the right to timely and adequate notice, and the role of the
judge at a hearing. But even though they directly implicate fundamental
aspects of procedural due process, courts are not participating in these
developments. And second, these additional procedural safeguards are
presented and discussed by proponents as if the procedures spring directly
from the right to due process.180 Some even claim that the procedures are
mandated by due process, despite clear precedent to the contrary.181 Thus,
even though the courts’ interpretation of the Due Process Clause is not
driving these innovations, they are nonetheless portrayed as synonymous
with the Constitution’s due process guarantee.
This kind of divergence is also noteworthy because of the potential for
perceived unfairness. For every individual who beneﬁts from these procedural
innovations, there are others who are on the outside looking in. Due process
is all about fairness,182 and having procedural safeguards vary depending on

177 See, e.g., supra Section II.A (discussing the emergence of right-to-counsel programs in
immigration deportation proceedings and eviction proceedings).
178 See, e.g., supra Sections II.B–C (discussing the use of active judging and electronic
transmission of constitutionally required notices).
179 See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, at § 17.8(i) n.70 (“[T]he state may exceed due
process minimum requirements when creating procedures to protect liberty or property interests.”);
see also PIERCE, supra note 33, at 736 (“Agencies almost invariably provide procedures greater than
those required by the APA when they engage in informal adjudication.”); Vermeule, supra note 31,
at 1924-25 (noting that agencies often voluntarily provide more than “the bare-bones procedure for
informal adjudication” required by the Administrative Procedure Act).
180 See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the use of “due process” language
with respect to right-to-counsel eﬀorts).
181 See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, § 17.8(g) (“The essential guarantee of the
due process clause is that of fairness.”); Mashaw, supra note 63, at 52-54 (discussing the importance
of “equality of treatment” in the realm of adjudicatory procedure); Redish & Marshall, supra note
32, at 483-85 (discussing the importance of fairness and equality in procedural due process); see also
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
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where a case is being adjudicated can seem arbitrary, if not explicitly unfair.183
For example, indigent, detained noncitizens appearing in immigration court
in New York City are automatically appointed free counsel if they cannot
aﬀord it, while similarly situated respondents in other parts of the country
are on their own.184 Similarly, pro se litigants appearing in court systems that
have adopted active judging practices can rely on the judge’s assistance in
court, while pro se litigants involved in the same types of legal actions in
other jurisdictions receive no such help from the presiding judges.185 The
same dynamic can exist in the notice context, too, where the method and
speed of notice delivery can vary depending on where one lives.186
That said, the Constitution does not mandate a uniform set of procedural
safeguards across all jurisdictions187—it merely sets a baseline below which
the available procedures cannot fall.188 Yet the growing divergence between
due process doctrine and the procedures available on the ground raises
important questions about the future of procedural due process and the role
of courts and doctrine. Can courts expand the demands of procedural due
process to include these types of innovations? If so, how? The following
Section takes up those questions, arguing for a dialogic relationship between
court-driven and non-court-driven procedures that is consistent with
longstanding due process theory and doctrine.

(noting that due process “[r]epresent[s] a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and
more particularly between the individual and government”).
183 See, e.g., Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot
on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 863, 984 (1994) (“Nothing . . . invites the
impression of arbitrariness more than treating similarly situated people differently . . . .”); see also id.
at 985 (explaining that when procedural safeguards vary within the context of public benefit programs,
“the recipient of benefits will often believe first, that favoritism, rather than rule, fuels the distribution
of procedural protection, and second, that had the recipient received the same process afforded others,
the result in his case would have been different”); cf. Resnik, supra note 85, at 85 (discussing
intralitigant inequities and the role of due process in the context of criminal adjudications).
184 See supra Section II.A.
185 See supra Section II.C.
186 See supra Section II.B.
187 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting
States from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
188 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1982) (“In its Fourteenth
Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial
proceedings are fundamentally fair. A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards
be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution.”); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 78, § 17.8(i) n.70 (“[T]he state may exceed due process minimum requirements when creating
procedures to protect liberty or property interests.”).
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B. Dialogue
Due process doctrine is well situated for a dialogic engagement with noncourt-driven procedural innovations. This Section explores the conditions
that make due process open to dialogue and sketches what a dialogic approach
to procedural due process could look like with respect to the procedural
innovations discussed in Part II.
1. Conditions for Dialogue
The Due Process Clause is diﬀerent from other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “due process
is ﬂexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.”189 Indeed, “[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept
of inﬂexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation.”190 Thus, due process rules must be tailored to the procedural
context in which they operate, and they must be open to revision based on
changing fact and circumstances.191
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the requirements of due
process may evolve over time. Over a century ago, the Court rejected the
argument that the Framers’ view of the Due Process Clause limits the scope
of procedures required by the Constitution.192 As Justice Felix Frankfurter
later explained, the concept of due process is, “perhaps, the least frozen
concept of our law—the least conﬁned to history and the most absorptive of
powerful social standards of a progressive society.”193 Indeed, procedural
189 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). According to Morrissey, this proposition “has
been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority.” Id. The Court
has quoted this language numerous times since Morrissey. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209, 224 (2005); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 n.15 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
190 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also
Farina, supra note 83, at 268 (“Due process jurisprudence has long claimed a special ﬂuidity and
sensitivity to context.”).
191 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 (1974) (explaining, in the context of prison
disciplinary procedures, that due process requirements are “not graven in stone” and may be revisited
based on changing circumstances); see also Parkin, supra note 11, at 1360-65 (arguing that the Due Process
Clause requires procedural rules to be reevaluated in light of changing facts and circumstances).
192 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (expressing fear that establishing a
ﬁxed deﬁnition of due process “stamp[s] upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to
the laws of the Medes and Persians”).
193 Griﬃn v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
wrote previously,

“[D]ue process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula.
Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more
particularly between the individual and government, “due process” is compounded of
history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout conﬁdence in the strength of
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rules, “even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due
process.”194 For these reasons, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that “‘due
process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a ﬁxed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”195
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due process
arguably reﬂects this commitment to ﬂexibility in the face of changing facts
and circumstances. Since 1976, the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test has
provided the analytical framework for determining what procedures are due
when due process rights are triggered.196 Mathews requires courts to
scrutinize and weigh three factors—the private interest at stake, the risk of
erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and the government’s interest—to determine whether
existing procedures satisfy the Due Process Clause.197 And since 1950, the
related but analytically distinct question of whether the government provides
suﬃcient notice of a constitutional deprivation has been guided by the
Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, which asks
whether the notice provided was “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
aﬀord them an opportunity to present their objections.”198
Both the Mathews and the Mullane tests are highly fact dependent. They
reject one-size-fits-all approaches to procedural due process, instead directing
courts to consider the facts and circumstances of the specific procedural setting
in which the due process challenge arises.199 Mathews and Mullane also root the
analysis in the present, giving little explicit weight to historical or customary

the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It
is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably
involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with
the unfolding of the process.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
194 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Although
history creates a strong presumption of continued validity, “the Court has the authority under the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and declare them
invalid.” Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415
(1819) (“[The] constitution [was] intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human aﬀairs.” (emphasis omitted)).
195 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
196 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319.
197 Id. at 335.
198 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
199 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (embracing the notion that due process “calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situations demands” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972))); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (instructing courts to give “due regard for the practicalities
and peculiarities of the case” when evaluating whether the constitutional requirements have been met).
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procedural practices.200 In theory—if not always in practice201—Mathews and
Mullane open the door to reevaluation of procedural due process precedents when
changes in the underlying facts and circumstances bear upon the factors that
courts must consider when evaluating challenges to existing procedures.202
Yet this focus on the facts has frustrated attempts to push due process
doctrine in new directions. By asking courts to weigh the costs and beneﬁts
of procedural safeguards that are by deﬁnition not currently in place, the
modern approach to procedural due process requires plaintiﬀs in due process
litigation to produce information that is typically unavailable.203 Even when
courts allow cases to proceed to discovery, there is often no way for plaintiﬀs
to marshal the evidence necessary to prove that current procedures violate
the Due Process Clause. Indeed, because plaintiﬀs usually seek procedural
safeguards that the government has not previously implemented or even
considered,204 it can be impossible for plaintiﬀs to produce the evidence
demanded by the modern approach to procedural due process.
2. Dialogic Due Process
The kinds of procedural innovations described in Part II can offer a way
out of this doctrinal dead end. These innovations create an opportunity for
dialogue between the courts that review due process claims, on the one hand,
and the procedural systems in which these innovations are taking place, on the
other. The innovations are often accompanied by rigorous and robust data
collection and analysis. They are therefore generating new ideas for procedural
safeguards as well as the type of evidence that Mathews and Mullane demand.
200 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 63, at 55 (noting that the Mathews Court “could [not] discover
guiding authority in prior administrative practice, which [was] based on the now discredited notion that
social welfare benefits are subject to discretionary divestiture”); see also Bartholomew, supra note 132, at
224-28 (explaining that the Mullane Court adopted a case-specific analysis that emphasizes flexibility).
201 See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 11, at 1312-15 (describing a series of federal court cases involving
debt collection procedures in which lower courts split over the question of whether the procedures
required by the Due Process Clause could be reevaluated based on changed facts and circumstances);
see also Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 234-59 (summarizing empirical research on class-action
notices ﬁnding that most judges have not embraced new forms of notice).
202 See Parkin, supra note 11, at 1360-65 (arguing that due process procedures can be reevaluated
under Mathews in light of changing facts and circumstances); see also Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 26065 (arguing that notice requirements can be reevaluated under Mullane in light of new technologies).
203 See Resnik, supra note 85, at 158 (“Neither judges nor litigants can identify with any rigor
the actual costs of various procedures, let alone model (or know) the impact in terms of false
positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or diﬀerent processes . . . . While one can state
the equation, one cannot do the math because the data are missing.”).
204 Notably, this was not the case in Mullane, where the defendant had actually provided the
sought-after notice (mailed notice to known beneﬁciaries of the trust) in the past. See Mullane, 339
U.S. at 319 (“[T]he fact that the trust company has been able to give mailed notice to known
beneﬁciaries at the time the common trust fund was established is persuasive that postal notiﬁcation
at the time of accounting would not seriously burden the plan.”).
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The right-to-counsel innovations discussed in Section II.A demonstrate the
potential for dialogue between non-court-driven innovation and due process
doctrine. The jurisdictions that have implemented a right to counsel in
deportation and eviction proceedings are generating exactly the kind of data that
has been missing or insufficient in prior right-to-counsel litigation. Plaintiffs in
those lawsuits had little difficulty producing evidence of the first Mathews factor
(the private interest at stake), but it was much harder to show the risk of error
when individuals proceed pro se, the probable value of an appointed lawyer, and
the cost to the government of a right-to-counsel program. Now, however, the
right-to-counsel experiments make it possible to assess the actual value of the
Mathews factors based on what is happening day in and day out in jurisdictions
where this kind of experimentation is taking place.
The use of electronic notice is also creating an opportunity for dialogue.205
When government agencies experiment with forms of notice that are
diﬀerent from the paper mailings that were used for decades, it becomes
possible to evaluate the impact of those changes. The government can
measure whether electronic notices result in fewer mailing problems, whether
notices are received in a more timely manner, whether electronic notice is
administratively feasible, and whether it is less costly than printing and
mailing paper notices. While it may not be possible to answer all of these
questions, the implementation of new forms of notice can generate data and
information that is relevant to the cost–beneﬁt analysis. Thus, it lays the
groundwork for a dialogue between the agencies that have adopted electronic
notice and the courts that may have occasion to rule on a due process
challenge to another agency’s method of providing notice.
Finally, a similar opportunity also exists with respect to the rise of active
judging in litigation involving pro se parties.206 Courts that implement active
judging can measure its impact on litigants, judges, and the court system.
Evidence of active judging’s eﬀect on error rates and administrative costs is
particularly important, as there is no other way to gather that kind of evidence
without actually implementing such a program.
The idea that a constitutional right can be informed and shaped by
changing facts and circumstances is not a novel one. For example, the
Supreme Court has recognized the evolving nature of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures”207 and the

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (explaining
that courts must look to an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” which evolves over time
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967))).
205
206
207
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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”208 Nor
is the concept of dialogue foreign to constitutional law; however, it is typically
used to describe a dialogue between courts and legislatures209 or between
government oﬃcials and aﬀected individuals.210
In any event, the fact-intensive nature of the Court’s modern approach to
procedural due process makes a dialogue between bottom-up experimentation
and due process litigation both appropriate and potentially powerful. When
reviewing procedural due process claims, courts demand evidence of the costs
and benefits of the procedural safeguards sought by plaintiffs. Government
defendants typically are the main—if not only—source of evidence regarding
the risk of error and the value and cost of additional procedures. But the kinds
of innovations described in this Article are generating new evidence in the
form of raw data and even expert reports, which plaintiffs can use to rebut
defendants’ factual assertions. This new evidence may come from innovations
occurring in other jurisdictions and perhaps even different procedural
regimes; however, as is the case in civil litigation generally, both parties can
advance arguments concerning the relevance and weight of the evidence.
This dialogic approach does not guarantee that plaintiﬀs’ due process
claims will succeed. But it can help plaintiﬀs convince judges that the costs
and beneﬁts may not be as clear cut as the government suggests—in other
words, that there is a “genuine dispute as to a[] material fact” that must be
resolved at trial.211 Ultimately, it will be up to the factﬁnder to decide whether
the evidence presented by the parties tips the cost–beneﬁt balance in favor of
the procedural safeguards sought by plaintiﬀs.
In sum, armed with evidence generated by procedural innovations,
plaintiﬀs in due process litigation have an opportunity to link on-the-ground
experimentation with due process doctrine. This kind of dialogic approach to
due process can therefore ensure that the changes wrought by the due process
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s are not the end of the road for the evolution
of procedural due process.
C. Limits and Objections
The kind of dialogue proposed in this Article is not without its limits and
potential objections. Ever since the due process revolution, judges,
208 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (explaining that
courts must consider “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
209 See generally Liu, supra note 29.
210 Cf. Tribe, supra note 30, at 301 (discussing the need for dialogue between the state and individuals
whose liberty the state seeks to constrain). See generally Handler, supra note 30; Kirp, supra note 30.
211 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

1156

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1115

government oﬃcials, advocates, and scholars have raised concerns about
courts holding that the Due Process Clause requires speciﬁc procedural
safeguards. A dialogic approach to procedural due process would encounter
similar objections. It could be challenged for being out of step with current
judicial reluctance to interfere with the operation of large-scale procedural
systems. It could be attacked for entrenching a new set of procedures and
stiﬂing future innovation. And it could trigger fears about disrupting
procedural systems that have been in place for decades. This Section
addresses each of these limits and objections in turn.
1. Inconsistent with Prevailing Judicial Mood
One potential objection to a dialogic approach to procedural due process
is that it is out of step with prevailing notions of the proper role of judges
and courts. Since the due process revolution, scholars, government oﬃcials,
and many judges themselves have questioned the legitimacy of courts
interfering with procedural regimes designed by administrative agencies and
court systems.212 Some criticize judicial intervention on separation-of-powers
grounds, arguing that it is illegitimate for judges to dictate procedures to
other governmental actors.213 Others claim that judges lack the capacity to
identify the proper procedures in light of administrative and budgetary
constraints.214 While the Supreme Court has made clear that the courts—not
legislatures or administrative agencies—have the last word on whether

212 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[N]ew
experiments in carrying out a welfare program should not be frozen into our constitutional structure.
They should be left . . . to the Congress and the legislatures that the people elect to make our laws.”).
213 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637 (1982) (“[S]ince trial court remedial discretion in institutional suits
is inevitably political in nature, it must be regarded as presumptively illegitimate.”); Robert F. Nagel,
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978)
(arguing that separation of powers principles limit the authority of federal courts to order relief
against state institutions); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1123-24 (1996) (arguing that “separation of
powers principles require that the answer come from the political branches” rather than the courts).
214 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 807 (1990) (“Courts lack the administrative capacity to alter basic
institutional practices directly and are constrained by both a limited constitutional mandate and a
narrow vision of their role.”); Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1922 (arguing that judges lack “the overall
perspective” required to fashion procedural systems); cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1017-18 (2004)
(summarizing concerns about the capacity of courts and judges to reform institutions).
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procedures comply with the Due Process Clause,215 judges reviewing due
process claims tend to be reluctant to displace existing procedures.216
These longstanding critiques apply with equal force to a dialogic approach
to due process. As an initial matter, just because an innovation is feasible or
eﬀective in one context or jurisdiction does not mean that the Due Process
Clause requires the procedure to be extended to others. This is related to a
broader point about due process procedures that is also relevant here—as the
Supreme Court has explained, “our cases have never held that improvements
in the reliability of new procedures necessarily demonstrate the inﬁrmity of
those that were replaced.”217
It is also true that government oﬃcials are typically in the best position
to understand the relative advantages and disadvantages of procedural
innovations. However, the Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural
due process is intended to account for this dynamic. If a plaintiﬀ is able to
produce the kinds of evidence demanded by Mathews and Mullane, then the
court must evaluate that evidence and reach a conclusion about the
constitutionality of the existing procedures. And while critics have assailed
the Mathews analysis in particular for asking courts to weigh factors for which
little evidence is typically available,218 the dialogic approach is rooted in an
understanding that procedural experimentation will generate exactly the type
of evidence that courts usually lack when evaluating due process claims.219
Thus, a dialogic approach to due process enables courts to assert their role in
the development of due process doctrine while also grounding their rulings
in hard facts that are generated by non-court-driven procedural innovations.

215 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (“The right to due
process ‘is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.’” (quoting Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))).
That said, as Adrian Vermeule has noted, administrative agencies “are now the primary frontline
expositors and appliers of the Mathews test.” Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1891. See generally Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). For example, federal agencies
that have used the Mathews approach to determine which procedures to make available include the
Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms; the Treasury Department; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
the Department of Labor; the Department of Homeland Security; the National Labor Relations
Board; the Federal Election Commission; and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1891-92.
216 See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1893 (arguing that courts “review[] agency
determinations about due process with a light hand”).
217 Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 172 (2002); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 451 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he Due Process Clause does not . . . require a State to adopt one
procedure over another on the basis that it may produce results more favorable to” the party
challenging the existing procedures).
218 See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
219 See supra Part II (discussing evidence generated by procedural innovations).
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2. Tension Between Constitutional Entrenchment and Innovation
Whenever courts are asked to hold that the Due Process Clause requires
specific procedures, there is fear that constitutionalizing those procedures will
entrench the procedures and stifle future innovation.220 This concern is
particularly resonant here, as the dialogic approach to due process relies on
procedural innovation occurring outside the realm of constitutional litigation. If
the types of innovations described in Part II lead courts to hold that the Due
Process Clause requires similar procedural safeguards in other jurisdictions,
courts may reduce the incentives and flexibility that enable procedural
innovation.221 Or viewed another way, the recent flourishing of innovation could
be perceived as proof that the courts and the Constitution should keep out.
But it is far from clear that entrenchment is a real concern with respect to
procedural due process. The wave of procedural due process rulings in the
1970s and 1980s did not prevent experimentation with procedures that had
been rejected by courts or never tried in the past.222 Moreover, a dialogic
approach to procedural due process could encourage future experimentation:
it would demonstrate the courts’ openness to innovation and their willingness
to consider data generated by jurisdictions and adjudicatory systems that opt
to try new procedures. In that sense, the dialogic approach could become a
force for anti-entrenchment, leading to procedural regimes that are more
inclined to experiment with additional or alternative procedural safeguards.
3. Disruption and Uncertainty
There is no way to avoid disruption and uncertainty when engaging in a
dialogic approach to procedural due process. The more experimentation and
innovation that occurs, the higher the likelihood that due process doctrine will
evolve in new and unexpected ways. This is the price of a constitutional right
that is defined by its flexibility and responsiveness to changing

220 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 83, at 254 (observing that “judicial declaration of process rights
marks the end of innovation and adaptability”); Friendly, supra note 2, at 1301–02 (agreeing with
Chief Justice Burger that it would be better “to hold the heavy hand of constitutional adjudication
and allow evolutionary procedures at various administrative levels to develop, given their ﬂexibility”
(quoting Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))); Levin, supra
note 98, at 346 (“Constitutional holdings, by their nature, are especially hard to modify or overturn
when experience casts doubt on their wisdom.”); cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976)
(“[E]xperience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate
additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.”).
221 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 2, at 1301-02 (cautioning courts to leave procedural
developments to administrative agencies).
222 See Parkin, supra note 11, at 1365-74 (discussing post-Goldberg procedural experimentation
in the welfare context).
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circumstances.223 In the end, if the evidence generated by procedural
innovations shows that the benefits of an additional or substitute procedural
safeguard outweigh the costs (per Mathews), or that the evidence reveals
existing notice procedures not to be reasonably calculated to provide timely and
adequate notice (per Mullane), then courts have no choice but to hold that the
existing procedures do not satisfy the Constitution’s due process guarantee.224
CONCLUSION
It is an exciting time for procedural due process. Procedural systems that
have been in place for decades are coming under new scrutiny.
Experimentation with new and diﬀerent procedural safeguards is occurring
at the local, state, and federal levels. Whether prompted by the pro se crisis
in civil courts, changes in technology, or a better understanding of the
shortcomings of existing procedural regimes, procedural reform is emerging
across a diverse set of jurisdictions and legal proceedings.
Due process doctrine and theory are not experiencing a similar evolution,
however. Even though the innovations described in this Article strike at the
heart of procedural due process, they are not the result of constitutional
litigation. The Supreme Court’s due process case law has changed little since
the due process revolution, and the Court’s modern approach to procedural
due process has been largely unreceptive to novel arguments based on new
facts and circumstances. Indeed, if the proponents of today’s procedural
reforms had ﬁrst gone to court seeking new and diﬀerent procedures, their
claims almost certainly would have been denied. The result is a growing gap
between procedural rights on the ground and due process doctrine.
A dialogic approach to due process oﬀers a way to reconcile bottom-up
procedural innovations and due process doctrine. The Court’s modern
approach to procedural due process is highly fact-dependent, and many
current procedural innovations are generating precisely the types of data and
information that the Court requires in due process litigation. For the ﬁrst
time, it may be possible for plaintiﬀs to produce evidence of the costs and
beneﬁts of novel procedures, enabling courts to more accurately balance the
interests of the government and aﬀected individuals. There is no guarantee
that this kind of dialogue will result in courtroom victories or doctrinal
change, but it is consistent with due process’s deeply rooted ﬂexibility and
adaptability, and it oﬀers an opportunity for reviving and reunifying
procedural due process doctrine.
See supra subsection III.B.1.
Changes in due process procedures need not always result in additional procedures. See David
E. Benz, Is Less Ever More? Does the Due Process Clause Ever Require Fewer Procedures?, 65 DRAKE L.
REV. 1 (2017) (arguing that the Due Process Clause can require less process in certain circumstances).
223
224
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